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ABSTRACT
This research examines the prospect of Southeast Asia as a future domain for chemical terrorism
over the next five years by assessing the correlation between the intent and capability of potential
actors to conduct chemical terrorism. Additionally, the effectiveness of prevention and
mitigation measures of the concerned governments is also examined. Southeast Asian countries
have experienced the persistent threat of Islamic violent extremism for decades. The exploitation
of chemical weapons (CW) reflects new developments in the methods of committing terrorist
acts. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have demonstrated the intent and
capability of chemical terrorism. It is highly likely that Al Qaeda and ISIS will disseminate CW
expertise to their affiliates in Southeast Asia that transform the region into a domain for chemical
terrorism. The main thesis of this research argues that Southeast Asia will be a potential domain
for chemical terrorism within the next five years because the gap that exists between the Islamic
extremists‘ intent to use CW and acquiring a full capability of such weapons has been narrowed
down. Lastly, it outlines the conclusion and policy recommendations to mitigate the risk of
chemical terrorism in the region.

KEYWORDS: Southeast Asia, chemical weapons, Islamic violent extremism, chemical
terrorism, proliferation
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INTRODUCTION

The development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is considered as one of the
greatest innovations in warfare. The 1948 United Nations (UN) Commission on Conventional
Armaments (CCA) defined WMD as ―atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons,
lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapon developed in the future which have
characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons
mentioned above.‖ WMD is a game changer in any scale of conflicts which is why many state
and non-state actors seek to possess this capability. Such weapons are crucial as evidenced by
modern chemical warfare that ultimately disrupted trench warfare in the Western Front during
World War I (WWI). Additionally, America‘s nuclear warfare defeated the Japanese unorthodox
warfare in the Pacific in World War II (WWII).
WMD, if used, as the name implies could destroy a large number of individuals or cause
significant damage to property.1 In recognizing these effects, the civilized world is determined to
prohibit the development, production, transfer, retention, and use of such weapons. Nation-states
are only allowed to develop programs associated with these weapons and their raw materials if
they are for peaceful use. Several international treaties were established to affirm the willingness
of the majority of nation-states to restrain from proliferation and use of WMD. Among the
notable international treaties are the following: Treaty for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
For the purpose of this research, the proliferation of WMD means the spread of nuclear,

1

Carus, W. Seth. ―Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction:‖ National Defense University
Press, Occasional Paper, 8 (January 2012), p. 34.
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chemical, biological, and/or radiological weapons, their technical know-how, and delivery
systems.
Despite the global non-proliferation and arms-control regimes, there have been states that
challenge the international norm by surreptitiously developing, proliferating, and even resorted
to using WMD capabilities.2 Concerns for these became even more disturbing when non-state
actors acquired and used chemical weapons (CW) on a number of occasions. Aum Shinrikyo, a
religious cult in Japan, first proved that modern CW can be developed by any determined nonstate actor and could be used to support their cause.3 In the mid-1990‘s, Aum executed CW
attacks using sarin nerve agent in Japan which resulted to death and injury of numerous victims.
The details of these incidents will be discussed in chapter 2.
While Aum‘s chemical threat was promptly contained by Japan authorities, security
analysts believe Aum‘s chemical incidents could be a precedent for terrorist organizations to
resort to chemical terrorism. This paper defines chemical terrorism as a method of terrorism that
uses the properties of toxic chemicals to inflict harm or fear toward the intended target.
The rise of Islamic violent extremist groups revitalized the threat of chemical terrorism
globally. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) both demonstrated the intent
and capability of conducting chemical terrorism. ISIS employed CW using mostly chlorine and
sulfur mustard in Syria and Iraq at least 76 times between 2004 and 2017.4 Al Qaeda, on the

2

The Russian Federation, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, and the Syrian
Arab Republic were suspected involved in the recent cases of chemical weapons use. While the
Islamic State of Iran and the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea are secretly developing
their respective nuclear weapons programs.
3
Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Technologies. ―The
Militarily Critical Technology List Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies.‖ U.S.
Department of Defense, February 1998, p. II-4-11.
4
Strack, Columb. ―The Evolution of the Islamic State‘s Chemical Weapons Effort.‖ CTC
Sentinel 10, no. 9 (October 2017), pp. 19–20.
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other hand, is believed to have equal determination in developing CW and the intent to employ
them in the future.5 In 2003, an aborted chemical terrorism plot in the New York City subways
demonstrated Al Qaeda‘s willingness to use chemical weapons.6 Given that these groups have
acquired a CW capability, they could spread the technical expertise to their regional affiliate
groups and inspired-individuals online to carry out more horrific attacks.
Southeast Asia is among the centers of international trade with a number of global
transshipment ports are established in the region.7 Southeast Asia is ―an area of concern for
WMDs proliferation and transit because of lack of political will to end the spread of WMDs,
incomplete legal and regulatory frameworks, weak strategic trade controls, inadequate law
enforcement and security capabilities, and emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, and
burgeoning bioscience capacity.‖8 Based on the findings of U.S. Bureau of Counterterrorism in
2017, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are the only nation-states in Southeast Asia with
strategic trade control regulations and laws while other nation-states ―struggle with control over
dual-use items‖ that include raw materials for CW.9 Meanwhile, Southeast Asia is a region
notorious for hospitable terrain for myriad terrorist and insurgent groups, given its history,
geography, and demographics.10 Existing transnational terrorist organizations particularly Al
Qaeda and ISIS, still pose threats on regional stability and United States interests in Southeast
Asia.
5

Dunn, Lewis A. ―Can Al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?‖ Center for
the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction| NDU Press, Occasional Paper 3, July 2005, p. 5.
6
Ibid., p.5.
7
Bureau of Counterterrorism. ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2017.‖ Washington, D.C:
United States Department of State Publication, September 2018, p. 227.
8
Ibid., p. 227.
9
Ibid., p.7.
10
The Soufan Center. ―IntelBrief: Southeast Asia‘s Vulnerability to Terrorism.‖
Intelbrief, January 31, 2019. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-southeast-asias-vulnerabilityto-terrorism/.
3

Several Southeast Asian Islamic violent extremist groups and numerous individuals
pledged allegiance with Al Qaeda and/or ISIS and accepted their leadership and doctrines in
conducting terrorist acts in the region. These alliances open the opportunity for violent extremists
or terrorists to gain access to resources and knowledge on updated methods of conducting
terrorism from other groups in the Middle East which include the development and employment
of CW. Given the recent trends and developments in terrorism, this paper argues that within the
next five years Southeast Asia will be a potential domain for chemical terrorism. This would
drastically alter the nature of terrorism in the region that will bring new challenges to regional
countries and their security partnership with the United States.

Scope of Study
While the entire Southeast Asia region comprises eleven countries, for the purpose of this
study the collective term ―Southeast Asia‖ refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Singapore.11 These countries are geographically interconnected and have experienced persistent
and similar threats of terrorism for decades from the inter-linked transnational Islamic violent
extremist groups in the region. Furthermore, the timeline of the risk assessment for CW terrorism
in the region is limited to a five-year period. There are two main phenomena in terrorism that led
to the consideration of this timeframe. First is the continuing threat and transformation of Islamic
violent extremist groups in the region and second is the level of response from security forces
towards these threats.

11

Geographically, there are eleven countries lies in Southeast Asia region: Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.
4

Methodology of Study
The primary purpose of this research is to analyze Southeast Asia‘s potential as a domain
for chemical terrorism within the next five years. To accomplish this goal, this research first
examines potential actors who will commit chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia. Second, the
research analyzes the motivations of potential actors to commit chemical terrorism and if they
have the capability to conduct such attacks. Third, the research examines the inhibiting factors
that could lead to the prevention of use and if used, mitigation of effects, of CW in Southeast
Asia.
Assessing the probability for chemical terrorism is rather hypothetical given that there
have only been limited cases of these in the past. Thus, in analyzing the intent of potential actors
requires studying the maximum number of previous cases of CW use or attempted use by states
and non-state actors; the ideology behind the Islamic violent extremism; and the strategic and
tactical goals of Al Qaeda and ISIS, which are also used as the model of Southeast Asian Islamic
violent extremists. Certain assumptions have been made to assess the capability of potential
actors. The main assumption is that Al Qaeda or ISIS will disseminate CW technical expertise to
their affiliates in Southeast Asia. This assumption is valid given that most of the recorded
terrorist attacks and foiled attacks in Southeast Asia were executed by affiliates. In addition,
there is evidence that Al Qaeda and ISIS both possess CW capability which will be outlined in
detail in the succeeding chapters. Furthermore, Al Qaeda and ISIS are highly involved in training
individuals on the methods of conducting terrorism either in remote camps or in virtual space,
which has been established in various credible reports and studies.
Another assumption is that potential actors will develop their own CW program locally in
Southeast Asia given the risk of detection and logistical burden of smuggled CW if shipped from

5

the Middle East to Southeast Asia. The last assumption is that chemical terrorism will target
government officials and security forces, civilians, and U.S. or Western interests in the Southeast
Asia region. The rhetoric of Al Qaeda and ISIS leaders and what is happening locally are
consistent with this assumption.
In analyzing the inhibiting factors, the research also examines the counterterrorism efforts
of the Southeast Asian countries and their defense readiness and response against chemical
attacks. The research is limited in terms of identifying who among the list of potential actors will
be the first to commit chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia and on which country it will take
place. In providing the readers with an adequate understanding of the subject, the research is
organized into five chapters.
Chapter one is an overview of terrorism. The chapter sets the stage for this paper by
defining the concept of terrorism. It discusses the different ideologies and motivations, and the
evolution of modern-day terrorism. The chapter also provides a rationale on why terrorist group
seek a WMD capability.
Chapter two is the discussion on the technical aspects of chemical weapons. It provides
the definition of CW, discusses the different categories of chemical agents and their effects, and
gives an overview of the CW program. The case studies of previous CW use, consequences of
CW use, and the international arms-control regimes that seek to prevent the proliferation and use
of CW are explored in this chapter.
Chapter three is an analysis of the intent and capability of Al Qaeda and ISIS pertaining
to chemical terrorism. It discusses the background of Islamic violent extremism and the different
strategies and tactics of Al Qaeda and ISIS.

6

Chapter four is an analysis of Southeast Asia‘s chemical terrorism threat and provides a
background of U.S. interests in the region that can be targeted by potential chemical terrorism
actors. Similarly, this chapter talks about the evolution of Islamic violent extremism in Southeast
Asia in particular.
Finally, Chapter five outlines the conclusion and some policy recommendations to
mitigate the risk of chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia.

7

CHAPTER 1: THE FACE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is among the lowest catalyst for deaths worldwide based on the most recently
analyzed data of the Our World in Data.12 In 2016, the said non-profit website offered insight
into the causes of death in the world. Figures 1 and 2 indicated that terrorism was less than one
percent of the worldwide total. Casualty figures of terrorism are significantly lower compared to
other leading causes of death, such as crime and disease, but the impact affects not only to the
direct victims and their family but also to the entire community or country and its economy. In
2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres described terrorism as ―…a persistent and
evolving global menace… No country is immune…‖ in the first-ever High-level Conference on
Counter-Terrorism.13 Terrorism has become very multifaceted and deeply intertwined with other
security issues in diverse societies across the globe. The problem is quite substantial for
governments to solve given the intricacies that exist in a terrorist organization let alone the link
between various terror groups and factions. Hence, it is important to fully recognize its context
and the evolving trend of extremist organizations in order to counter, eliminate, or mitigate a
persistent threat to society.

Diverse Definition Similar Tactics
The term ―terrorism‖ has been defined in several ways by the international community
and not even the nations‘ security sectors have a consensus on the precise description. Each has a
12

Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. ―Causes of Death.‖ Our World in Data, February 14,
2018. https://ourworldindata.org/causes-of-death.
13
Guterres, António. ―Uniting the World against Terrorism.‖ New York, NY, June 2018.
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/26junesgoped-counterterrorism-EN.pdf.
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varied narrative because even within a state the root cause and impact can greatly differ, as well
as the approaches in crafting solutions.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)15, the
Department of State16, and the Department of Defense (DoD)17, all define terrorism distinctively.
Bruce Hoffman, a professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, developed a useful
reference in explaining terrorism.

Figure 1. The Worldwide Number of Deaths by Cause in 2016
Source: Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. ―Causes of Death.‖ Our World in Data, February 14,
2018. https://ourworldindata.org/causes-of-death.
14

Pratt, Andrew Nichols. ―Terrorism‘s Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever.‖
Connections 10, no. 2 (2011), p. 5.
15
The FBI defines terrorism based on the U.S. Code of Regulations as "the unlawful use
of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives".
16
The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as ―premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents‖.
See ―22 U.S. Code § 2656f - Annual Country Reports on Terrorism.‖ LII / Legal Information
Institute. Accessed April 12, 2019. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f.
17
The U.S. DoD defines terrorism as ―the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of
unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies
in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.‖
9

Hoffman defines it as ―the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or
the threat of violence in pursuit of political change.‖18 He argued that an action is considered an
act of terrorism if the following elements are present: it is politically motivated; violence is used
as a means to achieve its goal; it is intended to create a psychological effect on its ―target
audience‖; it is conducted either by an organization with distinguishable leadership or by directly
influenced individuals or by an ideologically inspired individual; and, it is executed by a
subnational group or non-state entity.19

Figure 2. The Worldwide Share of Deaths by Cause in 2016
Source: Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. ―Causes of Death.‖ Our World in Data, February 14,
2018. https://ourworldindata.org/causes-of-death.

18

Howard, Russell, Reid Sawyer, and Natasha Bajema. Terrorism and Counterterrorism:
Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations. 3rd ed. Boston:
McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2008, p. 33.
19
Ibid., p.33.
10

An act of terrorism is a commitment and a choice of an individual or group based on their
belief as a larger cause. Andrew Pratt, a notable terrorism expert, enumerated the following key
motivating factors why individuals engage in terrorism: dreadful histories accompanied by
humiliation; foreign repression; love for a lost land or era; lack of democracy, civil liberty, and
rule of law; lack of power sharing, ethnic, or religious discrimination; illegitimate governance; a
government‘s intolerance to minorities; extremist ideologies or zealotry; becoming a failed state;
rapid modernization; or charismatic leaders.20
In a strategic sense, terrorism is a tactic of the weak against a stable target. According to
Martha Crenshaw, terrorism is ―an attractive strategy for small organizations of diverse
ideological persuasions who want to attract attention for their cause, provoke the government,
intimidate opponents, appeal for sympathy, impress an audience, or promote the adherence of the
faithful.‖21

Evolution of Terrorism
Terrorism has evolved over time. The intensity and lethality of terrorist attacks evidenced
by the level of brutality have significantly increased. Brian Jerkin, a RAND terrorism expert,
developed a comparison indicating terrorists in history wished a lot of people observe their deeds
while the aim of today is to inflict the highest number of casualties possible.22 Audrey Cronin,
former Director of Studies of the Changing Character of War Program at Oxford University,
argued that ―terrorist targets are not the victims killed or harmed in the attack, but rather the

28-29.
p. 396.

20

Pratt, Andrew Nichols. ―Terrorism‘s Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever,‖ pp.

21

Crenshaw, Martha. ―The Causes of Terrorism.‖ Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981),

22

Jenkins, Brian Michael. Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening
Ourselves. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2006, p. 8.
11

government, public, or constituents among whom the terrorists hope to provoke a reaction of
fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, or radicalization.‖23
The weapon of choice is directly proportional to the desired severity of the attack
quantified by the number of casualties. Pratt further argued that terrorist weapons influence or
coerce society, including policymakers, to ultimately achieve their goal. Chronologically,
terrorists have utilized the following weapons: dagger, garrotes, guns, explosives, and WMD.24
Additionally, commercially available technologies such as electronic and automated systems
contribute to the complexity of their weapon systems. The U.S. DoD believes that advanced
technologies will most likely make WMD threats difficult to identify and defend.25
Another development in terrorism is the manner terrorist groups disseminate their
messages to their perceived audience. Notable terrorist groups invest in the improvement of their
messaging board to recruit and air their propaganda. Apart from the traditional face-to-face
method, they bifurcated into internet-based platforms like social media, websites, etc. and were
able to capture a wider audience. In the book, The Terrorist Argument: Modern Advocacy and
Propaganda, authors Christopher Harmon and Randall Bowdish discuss how different
messaging platforms like radio, voice and lyrics, newspapers, television, books, e-magazines,
advertisements, websites, and social media help terrorist organizations circulate messages that
carry their ideology.
With the burgeoning explosion of the internet-of-things, terrorist groups certainly benefit
from this transformation along with billions of people with devices right at their fingertips.
23

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. ―Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism.‖
In Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 3rd ed., 57–
78. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2009, p. 58.
24
Pratt, Andrew Nichols. ―Terrorism‘s Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever,‖ p. 3.
25
―Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.‖ U.S.
Department of Defense, June 2014, p. 3.
12

Online dissemination of terrorist narratives is cost effective and can be used alternatively as a
means of communication either for recruitment or training individuals to wage terrorist acts. The
ethereal web space provides anonymity and security to the actor, while they express ideas as a
medium to wage information war or even disinformation.26 Further, internet connectivity
facilitates the surreptitious transmission of financial and logistical resources between terrorist
groups, core supporters and affiliates. Lastly, the homogenizing effect between cyber and
terrorists in the physical world led some ‗keyboard warriors‘ who identify with a particular
terrorist group to work for them in terms by seeking alternative funding sources either through
hacking or various fraudulent means.
Terrorist organizations became transnational in terms of operational reach. One of the
drivers that made this possible for example is religious fundamentalism or fanaticism which
allows individuals to connect with other people through a common but often biased ideology.
Thus, it can widen the terrorist network across the globe as long as there are commonalities in
beliefs.
In Islamic terrorism, the global jihadist movement is divided into three categories. First,
the core group is considered as the founder or main sponsor of the Islamic violent extremist
ideology. The core group controls or owns most of the resources and manpower however, not all
of its members are combatants. The core group provides direction and strategy for the entire
organization and it conducts research and training which enhances their operatives and other
affiliates‘ capacity to conduct terrorism. Highly skilled individuals such as scientists and
information technology (IT) professionals are part of the core group‘s support mechanism. These
individuals also enlist women and children to their ranks that can either be involved in direct or
26

Harmon, Christopher C., and Randall G. Bowdish. The Terrorist Argument: Modern
Advocacy and Propaganda. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2018, pp. 109-113.
13

indirect terrorist activities. Currently, Al Qaeda and ISIS are considered the core groups of
Islamic violent extremism. Both have fairly similar ideology but there is a contrast in some
approaches and overall objectives. Such disparities are important to understand and will be
discussed further in chapter three.
Second are the affiliates that exist in the local region who adhere to the core group‘s
ideology.27 Some are insurgents or established separatists who pledged allegiance to a core group
by accepting their organizational leadership, dogma, and methods in conducting terrorist attacks
to achieve common interests. Alliances bring greater access to logistical resources and training
for local terrorists. Thus, alliances help equip actors to become more aggressive players.
The third and last category of a jihadist movement is the inspired or radicalized
individuals, also known as ―lone wolf‖ attackers. These entities underwent a radicalization
process commonly initiated via the internet. 28 Core groups typically publish messages for its
audience and encourage them from across the globe to adopt an extremist view of the world and
subsequently conduct terrorist attacks against the West and its allies. Lone wolf attackers are
difficult to identify and uncover because they blend with society.29 As such, they pose a threat to
anyone anytime they wish to commit a violent act. Daniel Coats, Director of the U.S. National
Intelligence, assesses that this kind of attacks will remain rampant and difficult-to-detect because
they often select soft targets to strike without warning and need not require advanced training to
do it.30

27

Stewart, Scott. ―The Jihadist CBRN Threat.‖ Stratfor| Worldview| Security Weekly,
February 10, 2010. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/jihadist-cbrn-threat.
28
Bjelopera, Jerome P. ―Domestic Terrorism: An Overview.‖ Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, August 21, 2017, pp. 48-50.
29
Stewart, Scott. ―The Jihadist CBRN Threat.‖
30
Coats, Daniel. ―Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.‖
Statement for the Record. Washington, D.C, February 13, 2018, p. 10.
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Finally, some terrorists and other transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) collaborate
in illicit activities. According to the U.S. Center of Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), the
partnership ensues because both parties have the following agenda: to co-exist in one geographic
arena, to cooperate for mutual interest, and to converge with the same behavioral group.31 The
fusion between terrorist groups and other TCOs may be influenced by their similarities in the
organizational characteristics.32 Both groups adopt concepts such as operational secrecy,
innovation, resiliency, and extreme violence in their actions.
Among the main drivers that help terrorists and TCOs thrive and evade security forces are
border porosity, population transfer such as migration and freedom of movement, financial and
commercial developments or globalization, and communications technology.33 Terrorism poses a
major challenge since underground networks can also be used as lines of communication
between core groups and their regional affiliates. The network can be exploited to transfer its
logistical and financial support to its affiliates, which allows them to grow and exert greater
control. Criminal networks provide advantages that can be exploited by terrorist groups that seek
to spread and use WMD as their mode of attack.

Different Motivations for Terrorism
Terrorism exists because of an ideology that serves as the connecting node uniting the
core group, the affiliates, and the inspired individuals to work towards common goals. Ideology
provides the belief system, which serves as the general direction of what an individual or group
aims to attain. According to C.J.M. Drake, a terrorism expert, ideology plays an important role in
31

CHDS. ―Convergence of Terrorism & Transnational Criminal Organizations.‖
CHDS/Ed, September 22, 2017. https://www.chds.us/ed/items/17382.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
15

the selection of terrorist's target and justification of the terrorist acts.34 Ideology defines the range
of legitimate targets and works as a logical parameter for terrorists to commit terror acts. Thus,
ideology makes terrorism as the means to an end.
An individual or a group will have wide-ranging motivations to become a terrorist or
commit acts of terrorism. Eqbal Ahmad, a Pakistani political scientist, concluded in his research
that there are five types of terrorism: state, criminal, political, oppositional, and religious. State
terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism referred to the acts motivated, sanctioned, and supported
by a nation-state against another nation-state. 35 Between 1979 and 2017, the U.S. Department of
State had designated four nation-states – Syrian Arab Republic (1979), Republic of the Sudan
(1993), Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) and Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (2017) – as
countries providing support for acts of international terrorism.36 As consequences, the U.S.
imposed sanctions to the abovementioned nation-states which include restriction of U.S. foreign
assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items;
and miscellaneous and other restrictions.37 In addition, the U.S. incriminates other sanctions laws
that punish direct individuals or other countries conducting in certain trade with the designated
state sponsors.38
Criminal terrorism is the type of terrorism inspired to support criminal activities or for
criminal gains. Political terrorism is referred to as the extreme practice of political ideology of

34

Drake, C. J. M. ―The Role of Ideology in Terrorists‘ Target Selection.‖ Terrorism and
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either left- or right-wing. As of this writing, far-right extremism is progressively developing to
be a serious concern.39 Based on the 2018 Global Terrorism Index, the number of deaths
associated with the far-right group or individual had increased worldwide from three in 2014 to
seventeen in 2017.40 Oppositional terrorism denotes the acts of terror of the rebellious group
directed toward the existing government.
Finally, religious terrorism is perhaps the most common type of terrorism. This type of
terrorism has been the emphasis of policies and amplified by the media since it has become the
most prevalent international threat in the past decades. Individuals who succumb to this type of
terrorism, such as Islamic violent extremism, are often stirred by extreme spiritual belief.41 In
2016, the Global Terrorism Database recorded that Islamic violent extremists were responsible
for approximately 70 percent of the terror victims worldwide.42 According to Cronin, religious
terrorism is the most feared and had caused larger casualties per incident, and evidence indicate
that religiously-inspired terrorists are motivated to use WMDs because it amplifies the impact of
their attacks as it would affect a wider range of casualties.43

The Troubling Rise of Chemical Terrorism
The possession and ability to use WMDs can be a pivotal moment for a terrorist
organization. Mark Dechesne, a political psychologist at the University of Leiden in The Hague,
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argues that there are factors why terrorists aim for WMD capability. First, they use extreme
tactics that can maximize the force of an attack and lessen the time of conflict.44 Second, WMDs
are used for strategic aims by gaining more advantages and diminish losses on their part while
reducing advantages and escalate losses for their targets.45 Third, the strategic aims can uphold
the legality of their ideologies focus on their version of truth and their identity.46 Lastly, the
decision makers within terrorist organizations could contribute to the use of WMD with the
desires to achieve their tactical, strategic, and ideological goals.47
Meanwhile, Scott Stewart, STRATFOR Vice President for Analysis, suggested that
terrorists‘ aspiration to acquire WMDs correlates with the current anti-terrorism and
counterterrorism efforts. Most countries subjected to terrorist attacks made adjustments to their
security protocols. As a result, WMDs will be an alternative means of attacking well-protected
strategic targets against conventional weapons or improvised explosive devices (IED).48 The
possession and potential use of WMD is a global concern especially for countries experiencing
continuous terrorist threat. In February 2010, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
expressed her concerns on WMD-armed threats. She stated on a CNN interview that ―the biggest
nightmare that many of us have is that one of these terrorist members‘ organizations within the
syndicate of terror will get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction.‖49
Consistently, the U.S. DoD considers both state and non-state actors‘ desire to possess or
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pursue WMDs as a challenge to global norms, regional balances of power, and U.S. national
interest.50 As an incentive of possessing WMDs, the U.S. DoD believes that terrorists can use the
capability to increase strategic leverage; as greater means for coercion; and the ability to deter,
disrupt, or defeat military operations or cause mass casualty attacks.51
Several security experts believe that terrorist organizations are more inclined to pursue
CW as compared to other types of WMDs. Based on the University of Maryland‘s Profile of
Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) by Non-state
Actors (POICN) database, there were 400 cases of pursuit or attempted use CW out of 580 total
CBRN cases from 1996 to 2016.52 Scientists and policymakers often refer to CW and biological
weapons as ―the poor man‘s atomic bomb‖ because they are inexpensive to produce compared to
nuclear weapons. U.N. officials estimated that the cost of affecting a civilian casualty per square
kilometer was about $2,000 U.S. dollars with conventional weapons, $800 U.S. dollars with
nuclear weapons, $600 U.S. dollars with CW and $1 U.S. dollar with biological weapons.53
Nuclear weapons require sophisticated and highly technical delivery systems for deployment
while CW can be employed using indigenous materials or by meager resourcefulness. Although,
it is important to differentiate the impact as nuclear weapons can obviously inflict more
casualties and create huge damage in a single use.
CW programs do not require a sophisticated facility nor a team of scientists to synthesize
and weaponize a chemical agent. A chemist with reasonable experience can fuse chemicals using
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simple instruments to produce a nerve agent like sarin and other chemical agents which are more
stable than biological agents.54 Terrorists can fuse readily available toxic industrial chemicals
(TIC) that can be purchased over-the-counter to produce a chemical agent. Therefore, the
increased flow of expertise and illegal, dual-use, and uncontrolled items pose a challenge in
controlling WMD proliferation.
A historical example of chemical terrorism occurred in Japan in 1995 when a Japanese
cult dispersed chemical agents in two occasions. Other instances transpired when ISIS employed
CW in Iraq and Syria battlefields between 2014 and 2017. Despite the absence of recorded use,
several intelligence reports from the U.S. and U.K. confirmed that Al Qaeda successfully
developed and attempted to use CW. The threat posed by Aum Shinrikyo did not last because the
Japanese government had successfully eliminated the terrorist group as opposed to ISIS, Al
Qaeda, and their respective affiliates that remain at large despite global counterterrorism efforts.
Thus, the threat of chemical terrorism posed by Al Qaeda and ISIS also continues and could
spread in other regions through affiliates or lone wolf attackers. Southeast Asian terror groups
have access to gain the knowledge or technical expertise for developing CW.
In summary, this chapter described the background and definition of terrorism for the
purpose of this research. Additionally, it laid out the evolution of terrorism to its current state and
differentiated the ideological motivation in the wake of terrorist activities. Finally, this chapter
established the important role of core groups, to the likely spread of the technical know-how of
the CW virtually via the internet, including Southeast Asia. The succeeding chapter will further
discuss the overview of CW program, lessons learned from historical CW incidents and the
international efforts to control the spread and mitigate the use of the CW.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

CW proliferation has been a concern for centuries and is considered as the ―original
WMD‖.55 Currently, there is heightened anxiety for such weapons because state and non-state
actors alike are evidently motivated to use them for offensive capabilities. In fact, between 2012
and 2018 there were more than 200 reported CW incidents worldwide.56 The repeated
employment of such weapons has weakened the global system of restraint against their use and
the international treaty that bans it.57 More importantly, the majority of recent CW attacks were
perpetrated by governments and terrorist groups that ignore international law with the most
recent reported events in Syria, Iraq, Malaysia, and U.K.
This chapter delves into the characteristics and production of CW. It further outlines the
historical antecedents that impacts victims, policymakers, and security sectors to provide insight
on how it is particularly linked to the nefarious intent of a terrorist organization. Moreover, this
research undertakes a close examination of the international arms-control regime in order to
identify the elimination or mitigation of CW threats in general.

Definition of Chemical Weapons
Historically, CW were used on the battlefield and modern use began during WWI. CW
are commonly understood as specialized munitions loaded with toxic chemicals that can kill
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indiscriminately.58 In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came up with a more
detailed definition of CW which is consistent and align with the Convention‘s objectives in
countering the proliferation and use of CW, and the elimination of state-owned CW arsenals.
Based on the Convention, CW are exclusively or jointly qualified by the following definition:
a. Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes;
b. Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or harm through the
toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released
as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;
c. Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the
employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b).59
Moreover, toxic chemicals are any substance or material that can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.60 These chemicals are produced either
in manufacturing facilities and are embedded in munitions, but such can also be mass-produced
elsewhere in makeshift laboratories.61 The precursors of CW are any chemical reactants that are
utilized in the production of a toxic chemical.62
Currently, the Convention does not impose a total ban on the production and use of toxic
chemicals and their precursors. CWC signatory nation-states are still authorized to produce and
utilize toxic chemicals and their precursors for the following purposes:
a. Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
b. Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against
toxic chemicals and to protection against CW;
c. Military purposes not connected with the use of CW and not dependent on the use of
the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
58
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d.

Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.63

CW come in various forms and have distinguished signatures when used. In the absence
of detection equipment, these signatures are effective in determining the probable kind of CW
used and in providing effective therapy for the victims.64 These features aid the first responders
and security forces in identifying the proper approach to mitigate the effects of a chemical agent,
more importantly when choosing the corresponding on-scene protective equipment.65 Finally,
knowing the effects of CW serve as a benchmark in crafting policies that aid in regulating and
monitoring toxic chemicals and their precursors.

Categories of Chemical Agents
Chemical agents are categorized into groups in terms of physiological effects namely:
nerve agents, vesicants or blistering agents, lung irritants or choking agents, blood gases or
systemic agents, sensory irritants or lacrimator agents, and psychotropic agents.66 As a general
characteristic, chemical agents come in different forms of matter—gas, liquid, or solid.
Depending on the lethality, chemical agents can cause the victims to experience discomfort,
incapacitation, or even, death.67 Usually, chemical agents affect the victim‘s body through
inhalation and absorption through the skin (percutaneous) and eyes, but an immediate effect
could also be seen when enough quantity of these chemicals is ingested.68
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The range of chemical infection varies on the persistency of chemical agents or the
duration of the chemical hazard that lingers in the atmosphere once disseminated which could
last from several hours to weeks. Persistent agents are used in creating obstacles ranging from
contaminating strategic places or equipment, area denial, and to cause mass fatalities.69 Environmental factors such as weather, temperature, humidity, and wind velocity affect the persistency
of chemical agents.70 For instance, a strong wind may lessen the persistency of a chemical agent
while a heavy rain may decrease its effectiveness.
The following are the distinct characteristics and descriptions of the different categories
of chemical agent.
Nerve Agents. Nerve agents are highly toxic chemicals. They have rapid effects if
inhaled or absorbed through skin or eyes.71 These chemical agents disrupt the nervous system by
impairing the transmission of nerve impulses which may result in a shock or immediate death
due to respiratory failure.72 These agents are stable, odorless, colorless, and tasteless when
dissolved in water or food.73
The ―G‖-series and the ―V‖-series are the most popular nerve agents. The first nerve
agent ever synthesized was tabun (GA) in 1936. Sarin (GB) was discovered in 1939, followed by
soman (GD) in 1944, and finally the more obscure cyclosarin (GF) in 1949. The agents in the
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―G‖- series, gained their code letter from their country of origin, Germany.74 The ―V‖-series
means ―venomous‖, involving VE, VM, and VX, were first produced by British scientists in
1948 with a very high lethality even in small quantity.75 For instance, a ten-milligram of VX is
enough doses to harm or kill a 70-kilogram human.76
Finally, victims exposed to nerve agents may suffer the following symptoms: chest
tightness, shortness of breath, excessive sweating, vomiting, abdominal cramps, seizures, coma,
and death.77 Antidotes are available as a therapy for the victims but need immediate
administration upon the victim‘s exposure to maximize their effectiveness.78
Vesicants or Blistering Agents. Vesicants are chemical agents that can cause burns,
blisters, or temporary blindness when absorbed through skin or eyes.79 When inhaled, these
agents damage the lungs that may cause difficulty in breathing or even death due to suffocation.
Among the common blistering agents are mustard agents, lewisite, and phosgene oxime.80
Mustard gases are persistent agents, smell or taste like mustard or garlic, and ranges from
yellow to dark brown in color.81 Historically, sulfur mustards were known as ―king of the war
gases,‖ in WWI alone they caused more chemical casualties as compared to chlorine, phosgene,
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and cyanide combined.82 Medical practitioners argue that mustard agents have low toxicity level
but a chemical incident involving such agents can quickly overwhelm medical facilities with
casualties seeking medical attention.83 More importantly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
noted that mustard agents are not commercially available, but are easy to synthesize with the
help of a production guide.84
Blood Agents. Blood agents are another type of highly toxic chemical agents that can
cause instantaneous death upon inhalation of lethal dosage because they block the circulation of
oxygen within the blood.85 Hydrogen cyanide and cyanide salts are the chemicals of this
category. Hydrogen cyanide is highly volatile gas that smells like almond while cyanide salt is
odorless and solid in form.86 These chemical agents are commercially available as they are
utilized for electroplating, metallurgy, organic chemicals production, photographic developing,
manufacture of plastics, fumigation of ships, and selected mining processes.87
Choking Agents. Choking agents are chemical agents that can directly injure the
respiratory systems.88 Victims exposed to these agents experience irritation of the nose and
throat, difficulty in breathing, and inflammation of the lungs that can lead to death due to lack of
oxygen.89 Phosgene, ammonia, and chlorine are common forms of choking agents. Historically,
choking agents, particularly chlorine and phosgene, were developed for wartime use and were
82
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utilized during WWI.90 Most of these chemical agents are in gaseous form and have distinct
odors.91
Additionally, choking agents are also commercially available and are classified as among
the toxic industrial chemicals with high hazard index.92 Chlorine is a yellow-green substance
with strong irritating odor and mostly used as a bleach in paper and cloth manufacturing.93
Phosgene smells like a freshly cut hay and is commonly used to manufacture pesticides and
pharmaceuticals.94 Lastly, ammonia could serve as a choking agent which is normally used in
numerous household and industrial cleaning merchandises.95
Sensory Irritants. Sensory agents are among the category of non-lethal chemicals agents
and they are mostly utilized as riot control agents.96 Tear gases are the usual example of this
category that is employed to momentarily weaken the body of the desired target.97 While victims
may immediately experience chest pain, nausea, and eyes or nose irritation, they are designed not
to be persistent.98
Psychotropic Agents. Psychotropic agents are another kind of non-lethal chemical
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agents that are designed to incapacitate the victim causing temporary paralysis, rigidity, or
mental disorientation.99 These are widely used as tranquilizers, sedatives, analgesics, stimulants,
and anesthetics.100 Examples of this category are lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), belladonna,
atropine, and phencyclidine.101

Acquisition of Chemical Warfare Capability
Traditionally, acquiring CW capability requires a lengthy process. For instance, a nationstate undergoes a series of research and tests of chemical agents prior to the large-scale
production of the weapons. In addition, a nation-state needs to comply with the bureaucratic
process of capability acquisition and development. In 1993, the U.S. Congress Office of
Technology Assessment outlined the following acquisition steps to obtain a fully integrated
chemical warfare capability.
1. Acquire equipment and materials needed for CW agent production and the relevant
expertise;
2. Produce agents in small quantities at a pilot facility to work out technical details of the
synthetic process, and then scale up to a production plant;
3. Purchase suitable munitions and delivery systems (or design, prototype, test, and
produce them indigenously);
4. Fill the munitions with the agent;
5. Establish bunkers (or other storage facilities) and logistical support networks for the
stockpiling, transport, handling, and use of bulk agents and munitions;
6. Deliver chemical munitions to the military logistics system for storage and transport to
the battle zone;
7. Acquire individual and collective chemical defenses and decontamination equipment,
and train troops how to fight in a chemical environment; and
8. Develop strategic and tactical battle plans for CW use, and practice them in operational
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tests and field exercises.102
However, in general, these processes do not apply to non-state actors as they only need to
develop a chemical agent of choice and integrate them with a delivery system. The non-state
actor can omit some steps in the process, for example, not having a standard storage facility that
will save them time and resources.103 Therefore, this shortcut method favors the non-state actors
especially for those groups who have financial constraints while it serves as a challenge to the
government forces in detection and prevention of a possible chemical attack.
Currently, the process to acquire CW is less complicated as before since toxic chemical
agents can be produced in various ways. The U.S. DoD assesses both state and non-state CW
proliferators as having the capacity to utilize existing commercial manufacturing infrastructures
in a given area to create their desired chemical agents.104 Additionally, proliferators can utilize
toxic industrial chemicals as CW precursors as discussed earlier.105 Chlorine and phosgene are
among the proven toxic chemicals available in the open market and possibly in the black market
while vesicant agents are among the easiest to produce.
Moreover, most of the technical details and methods to develop CW are readily available
via open source literature.106 Robert Turkington elaborated in his book, Chemical Used for
Illegal Purposes: A Guide for First Responders to Identify Explosives, Recreational Drugs, and
Poisons, the process of synthesizing various commercial toxic industrial chemicals to develop
bulk mustard agents. He explained that there are at least nine ways of producing mustard
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agents with an average total cost of less than a hundred U.S. dollars.107
Manufactured chemical agents require deployment to attain the desired effect. Aside from
the level of toxicity of chemical agents, their effectiveness is also dependent on the efficient
means of dissemination.108 Conventional delivery systems of CW may include cruise or ballistic
missiles, artillery, rockets, mortars, mines, bombs, sprayers, or spray tanks.109 Sooner or later,
dedicated terrorist groups could think of other techniques to execute chemical attacks. Former
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described modern day terrorist groups in a taped
interview with CNN as ―more creative, more flexible and more agile.‖110 Consistently, the U.S.
DoD agrees that the intricacies of terrorist‘s delivery systems are limited only by their
imagination.111 They have a wide range of choices that include indigenous material such as
plastics and sprayers to modern technology like drones.
Finally, the development of binary CW technology has increased the complexity of
detection and dissemination of chemical agents although it has improved the means of storage
and handling them. Binary CW use developed toxic chemical by mixing two compounds
immediately before or during the dissemination or dispersion.112 Each compound is stable, with a
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low level of toxicity, and safe for transport. Thus, the potential attackers or perpetrators are safe
from chemical poisoning prior to their use in staging the weapon to a specific location.

Historical Use of Chemical Weapons
The roots of CW usage existed longer than anyone could have imagined. Historically,
toxic smoke was used in ancient warfare by Indians in 2000 B.C., Chinese in 1000 B.C. and
Spartans in 428 B.C. as choking fumes to instill fear and panic in their enemies.113 Further,
Greek soldiers of King Solon poisoned the enemy water supply to induce severe diarrhea against
their rivaling troops in 600 B.C.114 Despite historical accounts of CW usage, experts determined
that modern CW warfare started in WWI with advancements in synthetic chemical production
and delivery systems.
On April 22, 1915, the first large scale use of CW was recorded when German soldiers
discharged chlorine gases from cylinders against the Allied forces in ―No Man‘s Land‖ during
the Battle of Ypres.115 Chemical warfare historians support that the Ypres chemical incident
triggered the proliferation of war gases prompting the Allied and Axis forces to develop their
own versions of CW. This era of CW competition was known as the ―chemists‘ war.‖116
Generally, the motivation behind German‘s first development and offensive use of CW was to
―have a new weapon of war that could break the stalemate in the trenches.‖117
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The terror on the battlefield brought by CW in WWI garnered different reactions from the
nation-state leaders and policymakers. For instance, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
favored the use of CW to shorten military conflicts.118 In 1944, Churchill, then Secretary of State
for Defense, emphasized in his memorandum to the Britain War Office a request for chemical
attacks on Germany. He stated: ―It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gases: gases can
be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave
no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.‖119
On the contrary, during WWII, Adolf Hitler of Germany did not favor the CW use on the
battlefield for an unclear reason.120 It was claimed that Germany produced around 12,000 tons of
the deadly chemical compound by the end of WWII sufficient enough to kill millions of
people.121 Unknown of Germany‘s exact war plans and despite an international treaty banning
the use of CW, the British government sanctioned extensive planning and preparations for
possible chemical attacks in WWII. The horrifying chemical incidents in WWI had
psychologically affected the mindset of the British policymakers that made CW as a high-level
threat for their citizens as stated: ―The terror of gas hung heavy on the public consciousness, and
with the advent of the medium bomber bringing civilian population centers into the line of fire,
the government considered the threat of gas to civilian populations to be severe.‖122
By the end of WWI, chemical attacks using chlorine, phosgene, mustard gases, and
Lewisite caused an estimated 90,000 fatalities and 1,300,000 injured soldiers and civilians.123
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However, some experts argue that CW were not effective strategically because such weapons
caused less than one percent of WWI fatalities and less than two percent of American war
casualties.124 Tactically, Piet Chielens, author and curator at In Flanders Field Museum in Ypres,
Belgium, says ―but from the point of view of the men who had to work with it—be exposed to
it—it was a terrible weapon.‖125 He added that ―psychological terror on the ordinary soldier was
immense.‖126 Finally, WMD scholars noted that WWI CW use were the driving force for
chemical protective equipment development like gas masks and the modern employment of CW
precedence.
During the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, Iraqi forces used CW against the
Iranians despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such weapons.127 As a result, Iran
suffered massive casualties estimated at around 60,000 soldiers and civilians.128 Iraqi forces
utilized mustard gas in their initial attacks then followed by nerve agents particularly tabun and
sarin in their succeeding attacks.129 In 1988, the Iraqi government initiated a single chemical
attack against the Kurds that yielded over 6,000 civilian fatalities in the town of Halabja. 130
It was determined that Saddam Hussein utilized CW during the Iran-Iraq war for several
reasons. CIA analysts assessed that ―selective use of CW can augment conventional arsenals,
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attain short-term objectives, influence particular combat situations, and significantly increase
enemy casualties.‖131 Iraqi chemical warfare sent a clear message that ―the use of CW to
demoralize and provide fear in an enemy is as important as inflicting battlefield casualties.‖132
Further, Iraq used CW as a force multiplier in defending its territory. Saddam‘s initial political
and military decision to field such weapons against Iran seems to be rooted in ―compensating for
Iraq‘s limited military manpower.‖133 Lastly, Iraqi‘s use of CW internally against civilians was
deliberate to specifically ―terrorize the Kurds and threaten their very existence.‖134
In early 2013, according to the Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Syrian regime under
President Bashar al Assad was held responsible for chemical attacks against Syrian rebels.135
Based on the HRW report, the regime initiated at least 85 chemical weapon attacks between
August 21, 2013, and February 25, 2018, in Damascus, Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama.136 While Syria
is among the state parties signatory of international conventions banning the use of CW, the
Assad regime allegedly used Sarin, VX, and sulfur mustard to inflict harm to thousands of
civilian casualties in the ongoing Syrian civil war.137 The international community condemned
the Syrian government for using CW against its own people; however, the case remains
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unresolved due to geopolitical differences within the governing international organization.
CW are also utilized for targeted attacks. In February 2017, Kim Jong-Nam, eldest
brother of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un, was murdered using the VX nerve agent
in Malaysia airport in broad daylight.138 The Malaysian government claimed that two women, an
Indonesian and a Vietnamese, wiped a liquid substance one after another, on the face of the
victim that caused his instantaneous death.139 Numerous CW experts and scientists suggested
that the assassins utilized binary chemical weapon using VX as the chemical agent. Several
countries condemned the assassination and called out North Korea as responsible for the
attack.140
In Kim Jong-Nam‘s case, binary CW were proven to be effective in conducting
clandestinely directed chemical attacks. Both suspects pleaded innocent on the assassination case
filed against them by Malaysian authorities.141 In their statements, the women insisted that they
were tricked by unknown persons and were made to believe that they were part of a certain TV
prank.142 Thus, if their statements were factual, it can be assessed that they carried those
chemical compounds safely and had passed through the airport security protocol undetected.
On March 4, 2018, a Russian nerve agent was employed in Salisbury, the U.K. against
Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy, and his daughter, Yulia.143 It is the latest known targeted
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chemical attack. The UK and other countries suspected that the Russian government was behind
the plot. As a result, 150 Russian intelligence officers were expelled from 26 countries in
response to the incident however, the attackers remain at large.144
Non-state actors have also turned to CW to commit acts of terrorism. Aum Shinrikyo, a
Japanese doomsday cult, executed two major chemical terrorism attacks. First, at midnight of
June 27, 1994, the group sprayed GB nerve agent in Matsumoto City, Japan while everybody
was asleep based on detailed accounts from Japanese authorities.145 It resulted in seven fatalities
and 274 chemical-related injuries.146 The second attack was launched during the peak of morning
rush hour of March 20, 1995, in the Tokyo subway system that yielded 12 fatalities and more
than 5,000 injuries.147
Aum is recognized to be the first non-state actor that employed modern CW to
deliberately attack civilians. According to the U.S. DoD, Aum CW case proved that committed
non-state actors could achieve technical sophistication or the expertise to threaten society with
chemical agents.148 Aum manufactured the following nerve agents: GA, GD, GB, and VX, as
well as phosgene and sodium cyanide based on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee for
Investigations research.149
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There are many lessons learned from the Japanese chemical incidents which can still be
applied today. First, the magnitude of chemical terrorism is severe because most civilians are
poorly prepared for chemical attacks.150 Second, the untrained and less-equipped health care
workers and first responders are vulnerable to secondary exposure of chemicals. Experts claimed
that Japanese responders were exposed to secondary exposure during the Tokyo GB attacks
because of ―insufficient knowledge of decontamination and protective measures that needed to
be implemented.‖151
Reliable chemical detection systems are essential to identify the chemical agents used in a
chemical attack incident and the corresponding protocol to mitigate the effects. Robyn Pangi, a
research associate with the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at Harvard University,
determined that there was significant delay in the identification of the chemical agent as the
nature of the problem during the chemical attacks in Japan. In addition, the chemical attacks
continued to have psychological impacts on the Japanese people.152 While victims of the GB
attacks recovered physically from the chemical exposure, psychological effects of the attacks
remain in society and victims‘ families.153
In hindsight, Islamic violent extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, have
established their own CW program to aid their respective political objectives. For instance, ISIS
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was responsible for over 200 CW use which were recorded between 2012 and 2017. The details
of Islamic violent extremists‘ CW program will be discussed in chapter 3.

Consequences of Chemical Weapons Use
As previously stated, chemical attacks could have direct and indirect repercussions to
victims, environment, and economy. The impacts differ in terms of short-term or long-term
consequences. In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a comprehensive report
of possible consequences of CW. Such weapons can directly result in mass fatalities and massive
injuries without damaging infrastructure in the target area.154 The use of such a weapon can
indirectly initiate panic and psychological anxiety in a targeted community.155
Exposure to chemical agents may lead to continuous chronic illnesses and environmental
damage.156 During the Iran-Iraq war, victims from previous chemical attacks, suffered eye
injuries and skin complications, structural abnormalities, and pulmonary diseases such as chronic
bronchiectasis, asthmatic bronchitis, pulmonary fibrosis, and large airway obstructions.157
Notably, deaths from pulmonary complications were recorded as late as 12 years after the
chemical agent exposure.158
Environmentally, the effects of CW can affect the normal quality and quantity of the food
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supply derived from plants and animals.159 Finally, chemical-related incidents may disrupt the
normal flow of business or economic trades and tourism activities especially if it affects a
significant area.160 Affected facilities need to undergo decontamination process prior to the
resumption of normal operations, thus, the disruption to business operations could have an
enormous impact on the livelihood and well-being of the local population.

International Treaties and Arms-Control Regime
The effects of CW were disturbing since the first application in warfare. As a result, the
international community aimed to cut further development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and
use of CW. Generally, signatory nation-states are bound to adhere to the provisions with the
option to withdraw their association from the agreement. While non-signatory nation-states may
adhere with the articles of the agreement but they are not compelled to do so.
The following are the notable international treaties and organizations which aim to
control the development, production, stockpiling, transfers, and use of CW.
Strasbourg Agreement. Strasbourg Agreement was the first formalized international
agreement regulating the use of CW.161 France and German signed an agreement
in Strasbourg, France on August 27, 1675, prohibiting the use of a poison bullet.162
1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gas, and of Bacteriological Method of Warfare, also known as
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the 1925 Geneva Protocol, was established to ban the use of chemical and biological weapons on
the battlefield but not the possession of such weapons.163 It was signed in Geneva on June 17,
1925, and entered into force on February 8, 1928. Notably, some countries signed the Protocol
with reservation because the agreement can be interpreted that development, production, and use
of CW for defensive purposes were not prohibited.164 It was only in the mid-twentieth century
when these nation-states recognized the total ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons.
In its early stage, the 1925 Geneva Protocol showed the success on the limitation of CW
use in war, particularly during WWII. However, the Protocol weakened because some nation
states have significantly increased their CW stockpiles and such weapons were utilized again in
subsequent wars, notably during the Iran-Iraq war.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,
commonly known as Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was signed on January 13, 1993,
and entered into force on April 29, 1997. Significantly, the Convention has 193 member states
and one signatory state (Israel), leaving only three countries (Egypt, North Korea, and South
Sudan) that neither signed nor ratified the CWC.165 The CWC requires member states to declare
their stockpiles and be verified by an international verification body prior to their destruction.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established on
April 29, 1997 with a specific mission to ―implement the provisions of the CWC to achieve our
vision of a world free of CW and the threat of their use, but instead promote the science of
163
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chemistry in which the intended use is for peace, progress, and prosperity.‖ 166 Remarkably, the
OPCW has been positive in minimizing the stockpile of CW worldwide. As of April 30, 2017,
the OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü announced that the OPCW destroyed 90 percent of
the total U.S. declared Category 1 CW and 98 percent of Russia‘s total CW belonging to the
same category.167
On the contrary, the CWC has been challenged on the continuous spread and use of CW.
Since it came into force, CWC member states, Russia and Syria, have allegedly violated the sole
purpose of the Convention. Additionally, North Korea, a non-member state, employed CW in
Malaysia, a CWC member state. Lastly, non-state actors – Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and ISIS –
evidently became known players in the global CW problem. More so, Al Qaeda and ISIS CW
proliferation and potential use are among the most serious international security concern in
modern times. In an event of a chemical incident, OPCW can provide technical and emergency
assistance before carrying out a formal investigation that could be requested by an affected
member state.168
The Australian Group. The Australian Group is an informal organization by member
countries with the intention to contribute to countering the proliferation of chemical and
biological weapons. The primary objective of the Australian Group is ―to use licensing measures
to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and
biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, in order to control or regulate the spread of
166
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chemical and biological weapons.‖169 The 1980s Iraqi CW attacks triggered the formation of the
group which has grown to 41 participating countries from only 15 in 1985.170
This chapter outlined the composition of different CW and discussed the horrific impacts
of CW. The weapon proved to cause mass casualties, long-term psychological impact as well as
economic and environmental damage. In addition, the effects of CW use have been maximized
against unprepared targets and first responders. Further, committed state and non-state actors
carried out CW attacks to gain a strategic and tactical advantage against their more powerful
adversaries despite international prohibitions.
Lastly, this chapter determines that CW are predisposed to proliferation compared to
other types of WMDs. CW are relatively stable, inexpensive and easy to produce. In general, the
typical chemical agents being developed and used were nerve agents, choking agents, and
blistering agents – all with commercially available precursors. Notably, Al Qaeda and ISIS are
among the potential proliferators of CW given their current technical proficiency and a network
of affiliates worldwide, including in Southeast Asia.
The next chapter will focus on examining CW capability of Al Qaeda and ISIS as the
patent of CW proliferation in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it will study the ideology, tactics, and
strategies of both terrorist core groups and gauge their intent of using and spreading the technical
expertise of CW to their affiliates in Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER 3: THREAT ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL TERRORISM

Al Qaeda and ISIS‘ possession of CW capability poses a serious security concern.
Having access to such capability, these terrorist groups will most likely employ CW in the
future. The situation is aggravated by a possible proliferation of their CW expertise to other
Islamic violent extremists globally which augment more actors who will be able to commit the
act of chemical terrorism. This chapter examines the intent and capability of Al Qaeda and ISIS
influence on the chemical terrorism threat in Southeast Asia. This chapter studies their ideology,
organization, strategies, and CW technical specifications that are essential in formulating a
strategy to counteract the chemical terrorism threat, specifically the Islamic violent extremism.

Understanding Islamic Violent Extremism
Sunni is the largest sect of Islam comprising more than 85 percent of the total Muslim
population in the world compared to its rival sect, Shia.171 In 2010, Pew Research estimated that
there were 1.6 billion Muslims around the world, which make it second-largest rising spiritual
group after Christianity.172 The division of Islam began in 632 A.D after the death of Prophet
Muhammad, founder of Islam, over leadership succession. Over time, Islamic religious scholars
interpreted differently the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, which eventually created factions
within the religion.
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In the 18th century, Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab, whose name is the basis of the word
―Wahhabi,‖ formed a religious movement in the Arabian Peninsula aimed at spreading the
traditional understanding of the Islam.173 He encouraged all Muslims to adhere to the
conservative practices of Islam, as exemplified in the Quran and in the life of the Prophet
Muhammad. In the early 20th century, followers advocating the orthodox outlook of Islam
formed a group and called themselves as ―Unitarian‖ (muwahiddun) or ―Salafiyyun‖, which
came from the word salaf means to ―follow‖ or ―precede.‖174
Islamic violent extremists with Wahhabism or Salafism ideology continue to cause
terrorism and other forms of atrocities worldwide. In 2016, Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban were
responsible for about 70 percent of the terrorism victims worldwide.175 Notably, Shia Muslims
and other supporters are also subjected to attacks aside from non-Muslims.176 In 2018, the U.S.
intelligence assessed the following: ―Sunni violent extremists most notably Al Qaeda and ISIS
continue to pose terrorist threats to U.S. interests and partners worldwide, while U.S. homegrown
violent extremists (HVEs) will remain the most prevalent Sunni violent extremist threat in the
U.S..‖177
Islamic violent extremists justify their terrorist acts on their own ―interpretation‖ of the
Quran178 and the literature of early Sunni religious scholars. It has been the rhetoric of the
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leaders like the late Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi for other
Muslims to join the jihad against the unbelievers and the ―fake‖ Muslims.179
According to Sohail Hashmi, associate professor of international relations at Mount
Holyoke College, jihad could be used for defensive or offensive purpose. Defensive jihad aims to
reject the aggression of the unbelievers of Islam which Hashmi further explains as a duty of
every able-bodied Muslim, male and female.180 Scholars believe that such kind of jihad
motivated the Afghanistan ―mujahideen” or ―freedom fighters‖ and other foreign Muslim
fighters in suppressing the expansion of the Soviet Union at Afghanistan during the Cold War. In
order to legitimize Islamic violent extremism and win support, leaders and propaganda experts
utilize the passages from the Quran that provoke other Muslims to undertake jihad with emphasis
on their duty in Islam and the rewards they will receive thereafter. Below are the usual cited
Quran verses that invoke provocation to undergo jihad.
a. Quran 2:190-191 – Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not
transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.‖ ―And kill them wherever you overtake
them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and trial (fitnah) is worse than
killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al- Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight
you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.
b. Quran 4:74 – So let those fight in the cause of Allah who sells the life of this world
for the Hereafter. And he who fights in the cause of Allah and is killed or achieves victory - We
will bestow upon him a great reward.
c. Quran 9:36 – …fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you
collectively. And know that Allah is with the righteous (who fear Him).
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Offensive jihad is primarily intended to expand the territory of Islam (dar al-Islam) and
ultimately to limit the domain of the unbelievers (dar al-Harb).181 Hashmi describes that in
offensive jihad, the unbelievers will not be harmed if they convert to Islam or to live
independently within Islamic sovereignty. Recent examples of offensive jihad were seen in the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. In early 2014, ISIS core group took control of a considerable
part of Iraq and Syria and declared it as an Islamic caliphate.182 In 2017, ISIS affiliates took
control of a city in the southern Philippines and declared it as the Islamic caliphate in Southeast
Asia. It is important to note that while all of the above territories are now back in the control of
their respective governments the ideology remains potent.
Islamic jihad existed for millennia. Robert Spencer, an Islamic scholar, author of The
History of Jihad: From Muhammad to ISIS, argues that Islamic violence is as old as Islam itself.
Spencer started by quoting what Prophet Muhammad said to his followers, ―I have been made
victorious with terrors.‖183 Al Qaeda and ISIS along with their affiliates and inspired individuals,
continue to wage both defensive and offensive jihad worldwide. They are committed to fight
against their perceived enemies both overtly and secretly. Further, their methods are increasingly
becoming brutal and innovative. As such, as long as Wahhabism or Salafism ideology remains,
Islamic violent extremism will persist regardless of leadership, supporters and the tactics they
employ. It is particularly observed that new devotees to the ideology are more aggressive and
violent than their predecessors.
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Al Qaeda and its Chemical Weapons Program
In 1988, Al Qaeda was formally established by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national and
charismatic leader, who settled in Afghanistan. Historically, the early members of the terrorist
group were enlisted from the network called Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office) also known
as Al Khilafah.184 This network was originally organized by bin Laden and Dr. Abdullah alAzzam185 to recruit and to raise funds from the Arab country, Europe, and the U.S. in support of
jihad against the Soviet Union. Based on the U.S. intelligence estimate, the original size of the
network trained by bin Laden in Afghanistan camp was about 10,000 to 20,000 fighters in
1988.186
At present, Al Qaeda maintains a hierarchical organization structure ―characterized by
clear lines of authority, functional specialization, and centralized decision-making‖ can be seen
in Figure 3.187 Based on the Al Qaeda‘s organizational structure, the Amir or overall leader is
directly responsible and has authority in all religious, operational, and logistical activities of Al
Qaeda whether inside or outside Afghanistan‘s borders.188 The Amir participates in tactical,
operational, strategic, logistical, and organizational planning.189
The Deputy and the Command Council are the authorities next to the Amir in Al Qaeda‘s
structural organization. The Deputy is the second in command and is responsible for whatever
tasks the Amir entrusted him while the Command Council, comprising seven to ten members, is
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considered as ―the highest decision-making body of Al Qaeda.‖190 The terrorist group has six
different committees working based on their specialized functions.

Figure 3. The Organizational Structure and Hierarchy of Al Qaeda
Source: Gunaratna, Rohan, and Aviv Oreg. ―Al Qaeda‘s Organizational Structure and Its
Evolution.‖ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 20, no. 5 (November 20, 2010), p. 1055.

First is the political committee which is responsible for the partisan engagements of Al
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Qaeda to its government or political partners such as the Taliban.191 Second is the religious
committee. This committee is in charge of the review of the Islamic laws, preparation of leader‘s
religious statements or fatwa, and assertion that all Al Qaeda‘s activities are aligned with the
Islamic laws.192 Third is the security committee which provides personal security services to Al
Qaeda‘s senior leaders and performs counterintelligence operations to protect the organization
from enemies‘ espionage activities.193 Fourth is the Administrative and Financial Committee.
This commission facilitates various administrative requirements for all the members of the
organizations and their families and is responsible for the financial services of the group such as
accounting and transfer of funds.194 Fifth is the Media Committee or the Information Committee
which serves as the propaganda group. This committee acts as the group‘s messaging agency that
disseminates Al Qaeda‘s ideology, leader‘s messages, and other information such as online
training and recruitment videos to the Muslim audience worldwide.195
Lastly, the Military Committee is responsible for all the operational and military activities
of Al Qaeda. The functions of the body include training of new recruits; conducting the internal
guerrilla war in the Middle East through its Main Unit; executing worldwide attacks through its
Special Operations Unit; developing new conventional and non-conventional capabilities for the
organization such as WMD; and documenting of Al Qaeda‘s operations and programs.196
Security scholars believe that Al Qaeda‘s prefer a hierarchical organizational structure because it
promotes an effective feedback system within the organization and it provides the capacity to
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promptly fill the position and rehabilitate its chain of command.197 Thus, the organization can
withstand despite losses of its key leaders.
In 2015, Daniel Byman, a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings
Institute, stated before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism of the House Committee on U.S.
Homeland Security that the ultimate goal of Al-Qaeda is ―to overthrow the corrupt apostate
regimes in the Middle East and replace them with a true Islamic government.‖198 Byman added
that the primary enemy of the group is the U.S., which is perceived as the root cause of the
problem in the Middle East. Similarly, Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affair of
U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), explains that bin Laden and Dr. Ayman alZawahiri199 believe that ―the only way to bring an Islamic regime to power was to oust the U.S.
from the region as it supports secular regional regimes such as Saudi Arabia.‖200
In summary, Al Qaeda opposes the U.S. presence in the Middle East, particularly in the
Arab Peninsula, because this group believes that the U.S. is desecrating the land of Islam where
its two holiest sites are located.201 Additionally, without the U.S. presence, the region will be
more vulnerable to their attacks and control.202
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Meanwhile, Al Qaeda continues to conduct terrorist attacks and encourages other Sunni
Muslims to direct their assault to U.S. interests and its allies. On February 23, 1998, World
Islamic Front leadership issued a joint fatwa obligating all Muslims to attack and kill Americans
and their partners worldwide to free Islam from oppression and injustice.
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual
duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to
liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and in order for their
armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. These
are in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah – fight the pagans all together as they fight
you all together; and fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail
justice and faith in Allah.203
Al Qaeda supports local or regional Islamic insurgent groups who fight for their own
causes and for Al Qaeda‘s message in general. Based on the 9/11 Commission Report, Al Qaeda
provided equipment and training assistance to the Philippine insurgents, specifically on the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and to the Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI) with members dispersed in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines.204
Tactically, Byman argued that Al Qaeda preferred historic and extensive attacks against strategic
or symbolic targets. Among this kind of incidents are the following: the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania, 2000 USS Cole suicide
bombing, and the U.S. Homeland September 11, 2001 plane attacks. It appears that each attack
was unique, innovative, and underwent extensive planning and preparations with recruitment of
personnel, acquisition or production of means of attacks, target surveillance, rehearsals, training,
and proof of concept of attacks. Al Qaeda spends at least three to five years to undertake
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a single strategic and surprise attack.205
Numerous incidents showed that Al Qaeda acquired and is prepared to use WMD,
particularly CW. This enthusiasm can be traced back on the willingness of Al Qaeda‘s leader to
achieve such capability. On December 22, 1998, bin Laden told Rahimullah Yousafsai, a
Pakistani journalist and political and security analyst, in an interview that Al Qaeda has a plan of
acquiring and use WMDs against its perceived enemies.
We are seeking to drive them (the US) out of our Islamic nations and prevent them from
dominating us. We believe that this right to defend oneself is the right of all human beings. At a
time when Israel stocks hundreds of nuclear warheads and when the Western crusaders control a
large percentage of this weapon, we do not consider this an accusation but a right and we reject
anyone who accuses us of this. We congratulated the Pakistani people when they achieved this
nuclear weapon and we consider it the right of all Muslims to do so.206
WMD experts believe that Al Qaeda‘s CW programs had started in the late 1990s.
Recovered documents, confessions from detainees, and a series of foiled chemical attack plots
have all proven that Al Qaeda‘s acquisition of CW signifies its strong intent to use them.207
Besides, a WMD unit is embedded in the organizational structure of the group as shown in
Figure 3. Historically, Al Qaeda was linked in several chemical plots using different kinds of
chemicals—i.e. the London tube and U.S. embassy in Rome in 2002 that involved cyanide; New
York City‘s (NYC) subway system using an improvised chemical device in 2003; and employing
sulfuric acid at Amman, Jordan in 2004. Notably, authorities in those countries were able to
thwart the chemical attacks, except for the plotted attack in NYC‘s subway. In a last minute
decision, the operation was cancelled by a senior leader of Al Qaeda in what turned out to be a
stroke of luck for the Americans on that fateful day.
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In July 2018, Aimen Dean, Military Intelligence - 6 (MI6) spy within Al Qaeda, revealed
in a CNN interview that the terrorist organization had attained a CW capability as early as 2001
and subsequently explained the reason behind the sudden cancellation of the chemical attacks in
the NYC subway.208 Dean, who was personally involved in the development of Al Qaeda‘s
chemical device, later confirmed that Al Qaeda had developed a chemical device known as ―almubtakkar-al farid‖ or what literally means as a ―unique invention.‖ He further described that
the device was loaded with either cyanogen chloride or hydrogen cyanide and uses a timer or a
mobile phone as a triggering device allowing the attackers to deploy safely. The CIA and MI6
were both convinced that the mubtakkar is lethal and dependable after they jointly developed and
tested a prototype of the device using the recovered blueprint from captured members of Al
Qaeda.209
As of this writing, there is no recorded case that Al Qaeda had deployed or used its
unique invention. It remains uncertain on when or where Al Qaeda will deploy the mubtakkar,
but what can be certain is that Al Qaeda will maintain the technical know-how and necessary
expertise pertaining to this weapon. Dean exposed that an individual named Akhil, a former
chemist teacher who became an Al Qaeda member was directly involved in developing the
mubtakkar. Akhil revealed to Dean that the terrorist organization sent four operatives that are
Saudi citizens who were holders of U.S. 10-year visas and previously trained on the mubtakkar
in Morocco.210 Akhil also exposed on why the NYC subway attack was aborted. Accordingly,
―Zawahiri called off the chemical attacks in NYC subway system because he was concerned that
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an attack in New York would be used to claim that Saddam Hussein had given Al Qaeda
weapons of mass destruction so that the Americans could legitimize the invasion of Iraq.‖211
Prior to the split of Al Qaeda and ISIS, Hashmi assessed that ―Al Qaeda is justifiably
perceived as the principal WMD threat of today because of its financial resources, its network of
affiliated organizations around the world, and the technical sophistication of its recruits.‖212 With
the capability on hand, Al Qaeda will certainly utilize such weapons to its advantage and attain
its ultimate goal.
Al Qaeda suffered significant losses in logistics, finances, and manpower as repercussion
to the U.S. September 11, 2001 attacks. More countries joined the U.S. in combating the threat
posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. On May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was assassinated by the
U.S. Special Forces in Pakistan. Under the current leadership, security experts believe that core
group Al Qaeda is merging with affiliate groups in the Middle East, Africa, and even in
Southeast Asia. Albert Barabasi argues in his book, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to
Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life, that Al-Qaeda will
continue to exist and pose threats to its perceived enemies because ―Al Qaeda is so scattered and
self-sustaining that even the elimination of Osama bin Laden and his closest deputies might not
eradicate the threat they created. It is a web without a true spider.‖213
The rise of ISIS in 2014 opened the opportunity for Al Qaida to regroup with its network
as ISIS became the focus of global efforts in combating Islamic violent extremism. As ISIS lost
its territory, Al Qaeda can use it as another opportunity to recruit and reinstate ISIS members,
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also former Al Qaeda members, back to the group. These members are experienced in combat
and could be effective in perpetrating either small-scale or large-scale terrorist attacks. Elaine
Duke, then Acting Secretary of U.S. Homeland Security, believed that Al Qaeda and its affiliates
are conducting small-scale attacks to ―keep their members engaged.‖214 Further, Al Qaeda has
rising new leaders like Hamza bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden, who may introduce more
extreme terrorist activities to revive the jihad that his father started. Ali Soufan, a terrorist expert,
assessed that Hamza bin Laden might be ―a unifying figure‖ for the global jihadi movements to
unite.215 Thus, having the means and intent to inflict mass casualties, Al Qaeda‘s resurgence in
perpetrating future terrorist attacks will be expected to be more terrifying and chaotic.

ISIS and its Chemical Weapon Program
In 2002, Abu Musab al Zarqawi established the Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and
Jihad) in Iraq.216 Zarqawi capitalized Sunni‘s anger and opposition towards the U.S. forces in
Iraq and the oppression from the majority Shia.217 In 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Al
Qaeda and renamed the group, Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (also known as, Al Qaida
in Iraq or AQ-I). AQ-I conducted a series of attacks in the region and among the notable attacks
was the 2003 United Nation Headquarters bombing in Iraq. In 2006, Zarqawi died from the U.S.
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air strike and was replaced by Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra‘i (aka Abu Bakr al
Baghdadi), a former U.S. prisoner. Experts believe that after the death of bin Laden in 2011 the
relation between AQ-I and the core group Al Qaeda weakened. In April 2013, Baghdadi
announced his intention of merging AQ-I and Jabnat al-Nusra, a Syrian jihadist group, and
renamed merged group into Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (Levant), also known as
(ISIS/ISIL).218 Al Qaeda core group condemned the merger of two groups and denounced ISIS.
In June 2014, Islamic State leaders pronounced the reestablishment of the caliphate
(Islamic government), declared Baghdadi as caliph (the leader of the Islam world) and
commanded all Muslims worldwide to support the caliphate.219 ISIS adopted the organizational
structure of traditional Islamic movement under the institution of the caliphate as shown in
Figure 4.220 Some security scholars described this organizational structure as ―one of the world‘s
most well-developed international jihadi movements in terms of structure and administrative
effectiveness.‖221
A caliphate institution comprises several councils under the leadership of a caliph. A
caliph has ―absolute authority overall religious and worldly affairs in Sunni Islamic political
history and imperial jurisprudence and has the absolute obedience of his followers after being
chosen by the Shura Council and those who hold binding authority within the organization or the
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Ahlul Hal Wal Aqd (translated as ―those who loosen and bind‖).‖222 Thus, all the decisions and
guidance of the caliph are final and undisputed in the Islamic world.

Figure 4. The Organizational Structure of ISIS
Source: Haniyeh, Hassan Abu. ―Daesh‘s Organisational Structure.‖ Aljazeera Centre for Studies,
December 4, 2014.
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/decipheringdaeshoriginsimpactandfuture/2014/12/201412
395930929444.html.

The first council is the Shura Council which is among the most important councils in the
caliphate. It is composed of between nine and eleven members and tasks to deliberate recent
issues in the organization, important decisions, and policies.223 The council is powerful because
it can unseat an emir or regional leader from his position. Other functions of Shura Council
include providing advice to the caliph; ensuring that all councils adhere to the Islamic laws,
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and recommending new caliph in case of the incumbent caliph dies.224
Second is the Ahlul Hal Wa Aqd which is composed of a large group of commanders and
emirs who were appointed and pledged allegiance with the caliph.225 Unlike with the Al Qaeda‘s
command hierarchy, these leaders can plan and conduct attacks independently in their area of
operations without seeking prior approval from the caliph as long as the actions do not violate
the Islamic law. Thus, ISIS‘ leadership structure follows a decentralized form of authority which
provides more security and survivability to the organization.
Third is the Sharia Council which is responsible for ―the spiritual and security
guidance.‖226 This council issues religious messages, guidance, and preaching; writes caliph‘s
speeches and statements; and provides commentary for the organization‘s videos, songs, and
other media.227 Sharia courts and judiciary systems are under the authority of this council. Fourth
is the Media Council which is in charge of the publication of Salafi‘s ideology and its political
messages.228 As compared with Islamic violent extremist groups, ISIS has mastered the
exploitation of the Internet and other mass communication platform to launch its concept of
―electronic jihad‖. This body maintains various websites and online forums, which provide an
immense collection of literature about ISIS ideology, teachings, methods of recruitment,
fundraising, training, surreptitious actions, battle tactics, bomb-making, and all jihadists need to
know about warfare.
Fifth is the Department of Finance which is in charge of managing the caliphates‘
financial resources. ISIS became the wealthiest Islamic violent extremist in the history of the
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jihadi movement.229 Among the sources of ISIS‘ funds were donations and grants, charity and
zakat (alms), ransom money, captured resources, revenue from natural resources and mining,
taxes and stipends, captured government funds, and agricultural revenues.230 Sixth is the Security
Council which handles the security and intelligence of the organizations. Seventh is the Military
Council which is ISIS‘ most important agency. This council is composed of sector commanders
that ―handles all military aspects, including strategic planning, battle commands, attack planning,
and oversight, supervision and correction of military commanders‘ operations, as well as
armament and spoils management.‖231 Lastly, the Administrative Organization referred to the
divided units of ISIS called the ―wilayat‖ means state or provinces which are governed by an
appointed official called a ―wali‖.
ISIS recruited thousands of Muslims worldwide to join the fight in the declared caliphate.
Consequently, at least thirty Islamic insurgents in different countries, including Indonesia and the
Philippines, pledged allegiance with ISIS.232 On their peak, ISIS, its affiliates, and inspiredindividuals conducted series of atrocities globally. From 2002 to 2015, the Global Terrorism
Database documented more than 4,900 terrorist acts committed by the groups associated with the
Islamic State.233 As a result, these caused more than 33,000 deaths, more than 41,000 injuries,
and more than 11,000 individuals held hostage and kidnapped.234
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ISIS threatened to attack the U.S. and its allies since 2012 and its leaders regularly
described the U.S. and its non-Muslim allies as ―crusaders‖.235 Further, ISIS leaders encouraged
their supporters to initiate attacks on their own against the supposed enemies of Islamic State. In
comparison with Al Qaeda, Byman observes that ISIS prefers targeting the ―near enemies‖,
which are the ―apostate‖ regimes in the Middle East specifically Syria and Iraq instead of the
―far enemy‖, the United States. Baghdadi prioritizes the cleansing of the Islamic community by
attacking Shi‘a, other minority religious groups, and its rival jihadist groups namely, the
Hizballah, the Yazidis, and Jabnat al-Nusra.236
ISIS strategically, favors territorial control and expansion. Byman elaborated that it
desires to establish an Islamic government where Muslims live under Islamic law. In 2014 to
2015, experts estimated that ISIS took over more than 34,000 square miles of territory in Iraq
and Syria. Furthermore, they controlled income generating facilities such as oil refineries and
other business establishments.
Tactically, Byman observed that ISIS employs terrorist acts to weaken the morale of the
security forces, to target rivals, or to conquer territory.237 ISIS and its affiliates became
international concerns because of their inhumane activities such as mass executions,
decapitation, kidnap-for-ransom, forced religious conversion, rape, extortions, among others.
Furthermore, ISIS employed CW in Syria and Iraq. ISIS is known to be the first non-state actor
to have manufactured chemical warfare agents and fused them with the projectile as a delivery
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system.238 Historically, experts believe that ISIS‘ CW ambitions started during the time of alZarqawi. In 1999, he established a training camp in Afghanistan and they started the experiment
of toxin production. In 2004, ISIS attempted to use chemicals by incorporating them with the
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) to create a toxic cloud on Jordanian soil,
however; the plot was disrupted by the Jordanian authorities.239
Some security analysts believe the group recovered massive chemical warfare agents
from the Iraq former CW facilities. Besides that, ISIS developed its indigenous low-grade CW
loaded with chemical agents such as chlorine and sulfur mustard. In 2015, the European
Parliament evaluated that ISIS had attained its CW capability because ―the radical Islamic group
had the following: money, scientists – some of the foreign origin – on the payroll, found an
abundance of deadly toxins stockpiled by the tyrants of Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and could make
more of its own quite easily.‖240 In June 2017, the U.S State and Treasury Department designated
two Iraqis as terrorists in connection with their involvement in the development of ISIS CW
namely, Attallah Salman ‗Abd Kafi al-Jaburi, ISIS CW and explosive manager, and Marwan
Ibrahim Hussayn Ta al-Azawi, ISIS leader in CW development.241 Furthermore, Joe Asperman,
French and a senior CW expert for ISIS, was added by the State Department to the U.S.
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government list of designated terrorists in March 2018.242
The IHS Markit assessed that ISIS employed its CW at least 48 times in Iraq and 28 times
in Syria between 2014 and 2017 by using chlorine and sulfur mustards against the Coalition
forces and civilians. The group utilized projectiles and IEDs as delivery system for their
chemical agents. The summary of ISIS chemical attacks in Iraq and Syria is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Timeline of ISIS Chemical Attacks in Iraq and Syria
Source: Strack, Columb. ―The Evolution of the Islamic State‘s Chemical Weapons Efforts.‖
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 10, no. 9 (October 18, 2017).
https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-efforts/.
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Columb Strack, senior analyst and head of IHS Conflict Monitor, believes ISIS used its
chemical weapon ―to slow down and demoralize advancing enemy forces, and to potentially
make an example of—and take revenge on—civilian dissidents within the city attacks to stop or
slow down the chasing troops.‖243 But for the U.S. government, it believes that terrorist groups,
like ISIS, pursue a WMD capability because they have the objective of killing large numbers of
U.S. citizens and those of U.S. allies and partners without warning and hesitation.244
The Coalition suppressed ISIS from using the CW in the Middle East. The Conflict
Monitor through IHS Markit evaluated that the instances of ISIS employment of CW in Syria in
2017 had lowered and these chemical incidents were only concentrated in Mosul, Iraq.245 Despite
this development, IHS Markit still considered that ―ISIS probably retains the capability to
produce small batches of low-quality chlorine and sulfur mustard agents in another place.‖246
The agency assessed that ISIS could incorporate these chemical agents with its IEDs to elevate
the magnitude of the attack.247 For example, to enhance the psychological impact, ISIS may
conduct a suicide car bombing with a combination of CW attacks in urban areas.
Meanwhile, ISIS proliferated and attempted to use CW outside the Middle East. In July
2017, Australian authority disrupted two terrorism plots in Sydney comprising bringing down a
passenger plane and releasing hydrogen sulfide, a toxic gas used by the British Army in World
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War I, in public places. 248 Khayat brothers, Khalid and Tarik Khayat, were charged with two
counts of the act done in the protecting, or planning, a terrorist act by the Australian
government.249 It can be assessed that the worldwide threat of ISIS CW proliferation and
potential use still persist despite the Coalition declared that ISIS was defeated in Syria and Iraq.
Just like the Al Qaeda, ISIS‘ ideology is still alive. Having attained the means to conduct
chemical terrorism, ISIS will certainly spread and use this capability in its future operations.
In summary, this chapter establishes that Islamic violent extremist core groups – Al
Qaeda and ISIS – both have the intent and capability in committing chemical terrorism in the
future. On one hand, ISIS had successfully fielded its CW which denotes its willingness to use
such capability. On the other hand, ISIS‘ CW are not lethal enough to cause mass casualties. But,
the chemical incidents that it did cause serious psychological impact not just to the ordinary
civilians but to the policymakers and security sectors as well. It can be assumed that ISIS will
maintain possession and will improve the capability of its CW for future employment.
Meanwhile, this chapter demonstrates that Al Qaeda has more lethal CW as compared to
ISIS. Despite no recorded chemical attacks, Al Qaida‘s mere development of CW and the
aborted chemical plots aggravates its readiness and intent of committing chemical terrorism. In
addition, this chapter shows that Islamic violent extremism persists as long as a group or an
individual believes in the ideology of Salafism or Wahhabism. Perish jihadists will always be
replaced with new members who are more radical and harmful. Lastly, this chapter establishes
that Al Qaeda and ISIS have regional affiliated groups and inspired individuals patronizing their
ideology and actions, including in Southeast Asia. Traditionally, core groups provide training
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and logistical support to their associates. It can be presumed that Al Qaeda and ISIS will spread
their CW technical know-how to their associated groups and inspired-individuals. It is assumed
that raw materials for CW production will be drawn from the affiliates‘ regional influence to
mitigate the risk of detection. The next chapter will examine the feasibility of CW proliferation
and potential use in Southeast Asia by evaluating the driving forces that may influence the
success of such terrorist activities.
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CHAPTER 4: CHEMICAL TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The U.S. and Southeast Asian countries mutually benefit from their economic relations
and strong security. For decades, the White House engaged these countries through bilateral and
multilateral partnership. Existing transnational Islamic violent extremist groups threaten the
regional stability and U.S. interests in the region. Government officials mostly in the security
sectors believe that Al Qaeda and ISIS continue to be a prominent threat in the region
particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Domestically, local violent
extremists seek allegiance with either Al Qaeda or ISIS or both.
This chapter examines the trend of Islamic violent extremism in Southeast Asia, which
threatens U.S. interests in the region. This section assesses the potential for Southeast Asia to
become a new domain for proliferation and employment of CW by jihadist groups, which is the
main purpose of this study. Finally, the presence of lone wolf attackers inspired by Islamic
violent extremism is also considered as an implied threat in each country due to its transnational
nature.

Southeast Asia and the U.S. Relations
The U.S. maintains its superpower status in the Asia-Pacific region since post-WWII and
plays a key role in ensuring peace and stability in Southeast Asia in order to preserve its
commitments to maintain free and open commerce, promote a just global order, and guarantee
open access to shared domain in the region.250 All of these have been maintained with profound
security and economic relations with several countries in the region for decades. The Philippines
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remains one of U.S. allies in the region while Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are the U.S.
economic and security partners. The U.S. government is committed to sustain its global alliances
and partnerships, including in Southeast Asia, to sustain a favorable balance of power since its
allies and partners magnify U.S. power and its leadership in the region.251
The U.S. has a relatively good economic engagement with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 252, a multi-government organization in the region. ASEAN, with over
600 million inhabitants, is a huge market for U.S. goods and services exports, and a decent
investment prospect for U.S businesses.253 The US-ASEAN Business Council claims that
―ASEAN member states, taken together, rank as fourth after Canada, Mexico, and China as an
export market for the U.S., while the U.S. is the fourth largest trading partner for ASEAN.‖ 254 In
2015, Americans exported over $100 billion U.S. dollars in goods and services collectively to
ASEAN member states, an increase of 81 percent since 2004.255
Geographically, Southeast Asia lies in strategic maritime chokepoints linking the Indian
and the Pacific Ocean, and connecting the Oceana region and the countries in Northeast Asia.256
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More than one-third of the worldwide merchant ships navigate through the Strait of Malacca, the
Strait of Sunda, and the Straits of Lombok and Makassar (see Figure 6).257 These Sea-Lanes of
Communication (SLOCs) have both economic and security importance for the U.S. and its allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. A disturbance on the normal maritime traffic flow in these SLOCs
creates a significant undesirable effect in the global economy and overall regional security.
The Strait of Malacca, being the world‘s second busiest transit chokepoint, is also the
direct maritime route between the Middle East and Asian oil markets – notably, China, Japan,
South Korea, and other U.S. allies and partner countries in the region.258 Based on the U.S.
Energy Information Administration‘s monitoring, the oil shipments pass through the said strait
rose to 16 million barrels per day of crude oil in 2016 as compared to 14.5 million barrels per
day in 2011.259 Oil industry experts believe that an accidental or intentional disruption on the
strait will cause a significant oil price increase in the global market.260 Militarily, the Strait of
Malacca is vital to U.S. forces deployment from Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the
Persian Gulf.261 Therefore, the instability of the maritime chokepoints in Southeast Asia affects
U.S. strategic interests in the region.
Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
the Philippines are among the U.S. partners in countering terrorism. These countries supported
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the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) against Al Qaeda and the recent Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The U.S government provides Anti-Terrorism assistance (ASA) and
Nonproliferation Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds for Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines.262 In Indonesia, the U.S. trained and equipped police officers to
―build the capacity to deter, detect, and respond to terrorist threat.‖263

Figure 6: Southeast Asia‘s Strategic Shipping Lanes in the Tri-border Area
Source: ―In the Philippines, the ‗Punisher‘ Takes on Terrorism.‖ Stratfor, September 10, 2016.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/philippines-punisher-takes-terrorism.
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In Malaysia, the U.S. assistance focuses on anti-terrorism training and border security to foil
transnational terrorists from entering or transiting through the country.264 In the Philippines,
NADR-ATA programs provide training to ―enhance the strategic and tactical skills, as well as
the investigative capabilities of regional civilian security forces, particularly in Mindanao.‖265
The U.S. Congressional Research Service analysts believe that Islamic violent extremists
are affecting regional stability and threaten the U.S. interests in Southeast Asia in various ways:
1. Rising Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia could lead to a direct attack against U.S.
citizens or interests in the region, as well as against the United States;
2. It could also act as a catalyst for recruitment for terrorist activity in Southeast Asian
countries, increasing risks for both local and Western governments;
3. It could serve as an inspiration for those people thinking of joining terrorist fighters
in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere;
4. It could provide cells that help finance terrorist causes in-country, in the Middle East,
and beyond;
5. It could heighten the threat of attack by Islamist militants against U.S. partners and
allies in Southeast Asia, which in turn could limit the ways and extent to which they support
U.S.-led coalition activities against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda;
6. Terrorist attacks have the potential to exacerbate regional tensions, and distract
Southeast Asian governments from other initiatives the United States supports;
7. An increased U.S. military presence in the region could become propaganda or
physical target for militants; and
8. The return of foreign terrorist fighters from Iraq and Syria, and the spread of the
Islamic State's ideology through social media could lead to further attacks and threaten partners,
allies, and U.S. security interests.266
Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. homeland, Malaysia and the
Philippines served as planning, staging, and training ground of Al Qaeda leaders that plot
strategic attacks against the U.S.267 In 1995, Philippine authorities unraveled Al Qaeda‘s
―Bojinka plot‖, which intended to bomb 12 U.S. airlines. Furthermore, Southeast Asia is among
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the regional sources of jihadist recruits and financial support of Al Qaeda and ISIS in conducting
global terrorism, primarily targeting the West. In January 2016, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) estimated around 1,000 to 2,000 Indonesians who pledged
allegiance to ISIS in Iraq and Syria.268 According to authorities, around 70 Malaysian military
personnel and at least 200 other Malaysians joined ISIS core group in the Middle East between
2015 and 2017.269 In February 2019, Malaysian authorities nabbed a Singaporean national and
charged with terrorism for giving financial support to ISIS, which is an additional manifestation
that ISIS received logistical or financial support from Southeast Asia.270
Southeast Asia lies in a tropical region and is one of the most popular tourist destinations
in the world. Foreigners, particularly Westerners, are targeted for terrorist attacks and kidnapfor-ransom activities. In 2001, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a Philippine-based Islamic violent
extremist linked to Al Qaeda and ISIS, abducted 20 individuals, including three Americans –
Martin and Gracia Burnham and Guillermo Sobrero – from a luxury resort in Palawan,
Philippines.271 Sobrero was decapitated less than a month after the abduction. Martin died during
the rescue operations a year after their capture while his wife, Gracia Burnham, was wounded.
ASG remains in the kidnap-for-ransom business deliberately targeting locals and foreigners in
the southern Philippines and in Malaysia to generate funds. According to the Philippine military,
ASG is supported by Ajang-Ajang group, an ASG‘s subgroup comprising younger generations
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of active and deceased ASG members.272 In April 2019, the Department of State designated the
Philippines as high risk for travel due to terrorism and kidnap-for-ransom incidents.273
In Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, an Indonesian-based terrorist group linked
with Al Qaeda and ISIS detonated multiple car bombs in Bali, which was considered as one of
Indonesian‘s deadliest terrorist attacks. The attacks yielded 202 fatalities, that included 88
Australians, 38 Indonesians, and 28 Britons, and almost 200 individuals injured.274 Some
security analysts argued that JI‘s motivation for the attacks was in retaliation to the U.S.-led War
on Terror against Al Qaeda. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. went through a series of reforms to
its homeland‘s security however ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens abroad against Islamic
violent extremists still pose a major challenge. Thus, the U.S. relies on the cooperation and
readiness of its security partners in combatting transnational terrorism in order to protect its
national interests.

Islamic Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines are home to around 212 million
Sunni Muslims, which is more than thirteen percent of the total Sunni population worldwide in
2010.275 Malaysia is an Islamic country while Indonesia remains to be a secular state despite
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being the world‘s largest Muslim populations because its Constitution preserved the equality and
freedom of religion in the country. In Singapore and the Philippines, Muslims are among the
minority groups in their population.276
These four Southeast Asian states are facing the very similar and closely linked terrorist
threat posed by the core Islamic violent extremists operating in Southeast Asia - Al Qaeda, ISIS,
and JI. In addition, Indonesia and the Philippines are threatened by various domestic terrorist
groups linked with the said core groups. While Malaysia and Singapore do not have active local
terrorist groups, government officials of both countries acknowledge the risk from lone-wolf
attackers and transnational terrorist groups such as the JI and ASG.
As part of its recruitment and radicalization activities in Southeast Asia, ISIS created and
disseminated through the Internet several brochures, tutorials, and propaganda videos in Malay
language to incite violence among the young Muslims and initiate terrorist attacks in their
respective country.277 On June 23, 2016, ISIS released a 20-minute video in the Malay language
provoking Malaysian youth to conduct atrocities in their country. On June 28, 2016, ISIS
inspired-individual tossed a grenade in a nightclub in Kuala Lumpur wounding eight people.278
In response to the attack, Malaysian authorities arrested a number of individuals on different
occasions, including the persons involved in the grenade attack. Malaysian and Singaporean
authorities are allowed to arrest and detain an individual suspected as a threat to national security
by virtue of their respective Internal Security Acts (ISA).
In Indonesia and the Philippines, the security forces have dealt with domestic Islamic
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violent extremist groups for centuries. Indonesia has at least fourteen Islamic militant factions
operating in the different regions of the country as can be seen in Appendix A. Most of
Indonesia‘s Islamic militants are located in the island of Java while some are in the island
Sumatra. Some of the militants prefer not to use violence to show their discontented with the
government however some security experts believe that weak response of the government to
their concern may result in their radicalization in the future.279 In the Philippines, the Islamic
militants are usually operating on the island of Mindanao or the southern island of the
Philippines as can be seen in Appendix B.280 Majority of Filipino Muslims are situated on the
island of Mindanao, where Islam in the Philippines was first established by an Arab trader in the
thirteenth century.
The evolution of Islamic violent extremist groups in both countries can be observed in
three different periods: the growth of early Islamic separatist movements, the rise of Al Qaeda‘s
affiliates, and the emergence of ISIS and violent extremist online. The intensity of terrorist
attacks in both countries shifted as the motivation and means of conducting terrorism changed
over time.
The early separatist movements adhered to terrorism to oppose foreign power. During the
colonial period, the Indonesian Islamic movement fought against the Dutch colonial forces while
in the Philippines Islamic militants revolted against the Spanish colonial forces in the sixteenth
century and against the Americans in the late nineteenth century.281 Filipino Muslims or referred
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as ―Moro‖ were armed only with bolo or machete but they succeeded in defending the island of
Mindanao against the conquest of foreign forces.
Islamic separatist movements grew in Indonesia and in the Philippines as these countries
became independent states. These secessionist groups were motivated to be independent from the
newly established governments and control their ancestral domains. In Indonesia, the Aceh
Merdeka Movement, also known as Free Aceh or GAM, fought for an independent Islamic
kingdom in a predominant Muslim Aceh Province, located in the tip of Sumatra since the
1970s.282 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established in 1972 in the
Philippines which aims for an independent Islamic state in the Muslim concentrated region on
the island of Mindanao.283 Aceh‘s influence in the region was contained by the Indonesian
government but some security analysts believe this Islamic militant group has ―created safe
havens for other militant groups to operate and recruit.‖284 The MNLF started to work with the
Philippine government after the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) in 1989 and purportedly, abandoned its armed struggle after a final peace agreement
was signed in 1996. The effects of terrorism brought by the early Islamic separatist groups were
only confined on the concerned nation-state and their goals could be attained through a
compromise with the affected country to end the group‘s atrocities. However, negotiation
between the government and the separatist group could potentially split a big organization for
other members may not be satisfied with the terms of the agreement. Thus, it will lead to the rise
of a splinter group.
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The second evolution of Islamic violent extremist groups in Indonesia and in the
Philippines was the rise of Al Qaeda‘s affiliate groups. As discussed in chapter one, affiliate
groups embrace organizational leadership, dogma, and methods in conducting terrorist attacks.
Additionally, this alliance brings better access to training and resources for the local groups. This
period became the new era of Islamic militancy in the region. There were significant changes in
the source of funds, motivation, leadership, area of operations, method of attacks, and target
selections of terrorist groups in both countries.
Financially, bin Laden started supporting its Southeast Asian affiliate groups by funding
the establishment of JI in Indonesia, and ASG and Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM) in the
Philippines in the 1990s. Additionally, Al Qaeda provided funds to the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), a splinter group of MNLF. Al Qaeda‘s fund support was instrumental to local
terrorist groups to organize more attacks and recruit more members. In motivational terms, most
of the domestic Islamic militants applied the extremist ideology of Al Qaeda in seeking domestic
objectives. For instance, JI seeks ―to overthrow the Indonesian Government and, ultimately,
establish a pan-Islamic state across Southeast Asia.‖285 In the Philippines, ASG seeks ―to
establish an Islamic State in Mindanao, particularly in Sulu archipelago and eventually, launch
an Islamic caliphate across Southeast Asia.‖286
In terms of leadership, Al Qaeda provided the direction and guidance to its affiliates as
discussed in chapter three while the JI became the regional core group among the Islamic violent
extremist groups. It has active members in Australia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia,
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the Philippines, Brunei, and Thailand.287 Furthermore, JI members provided training on bombmaking to MILF, RSM, and ASG members, which became the new method of attacks in the
region. Aside from remotely-detonated IEDs, JI also orchestrated suicide bombing attacks. JI
members were responsible for the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, killing 13 and wounding 149
individuals, and the 2004 Australian Embassy attacks killing 10 and wounding 150 individuals in
Indonesia.288 In the Philippines, IEDs became the weapons of choice of ASG and Islamic violent
extremist groups in attacking their desired targets. Based on the report of Action on Armed
Violence (AOV) in 2016, there were 271 explosive incidents that occurred in the Philippines
killing and injuring 1,259 civilians and 529 government security forces, making the country
among the twenty worst-affected countries of explosive violence between 2011 and 2015.289
On target selection, these groups target both security forces and civilians particularly
Westerners. Soft targets such as public transports, churches, shopping malls, business
establishments, and other public places were among the places subjected to bombing attacks.
ASG first showed its ruthlessness by bombing Christian predominant areas in Southern
Philippines as directed by Al Qaeda.290 Furthermore, U.S. citizens and U.S. strategic
infrastructures were among their desired targets. Hilarion del Rosario Santos III, the RSM
founder, attested that he collaborated with ASG, JI, and Al Qaeda to conduct terrorist attacks in
Manila targeting the U.S. Embassy and business establishments patronized by foreigners,
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particularly U.S. citizens.291
Al Qaeda and its Southeast Asian affiliates caused great damage in the region. In
response, the Indonesian government cracked down on JI‘s organization and its activities, which
resulted positively. Since 2002, JI leaders and members either killed or arrested by Indonesian
authorities led to the group‘s decline. Indonesian government received praise from the
international community for successfully containing the JI‘s threat. However, government
officials and security analysts believe that the group continues to be a threat to society. As
evidenced, the Indonesian government foiled a rocket attack plot on Marina Bay, Singapore in
2016.292
In the Philippines, the majority of MILF members abandoned its armed-struggle and
decided to integrate with the community after the peace agreement was signed in 2014. The
Philippine Government will create a new autonomous region, also known as Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) that allows the Muslim leadership to have
more autonomy over the budgeting issues, judiciary system, indigenous rights, and natural
resources in Mindanao.293 RSM group was disbanded after the arrest of its leader in 2005 and the
death of another member. ASG also suffered massive losses due to casualties in combat against
the Philippine security forces. Based on the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) data, the Abu Sayyaf had reached at around 1,000 to 1,500
armed-members on its peak in 2000 and the number of members declined at around 200 to 400
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armed-individuals in 2015.294
The third evolution of Islamic violent extremist groups in Indonesia and in the
Philippines is the rise of ISIS and domestic violent extremism. When ISIS declared a caliphate in
Syria and Iraq in 2014, newly organized Islamic violent extremist group and former Al Qaeda‘s
affiliate groups pledged allegiance to ISIS. These groups also received funding, online training,
and preaching from the ISIS core group in the Middle East. ISIS affiliates employed the same
methods of attack learned from Al Qaeda and JI‘s training camp and enhance the collaboration
among members of different groups.295 In addition, ISIS affiliates emulate the core group
methods of conducting terror in Iraq and Syria such as seizing control of territory and videorecorded beheading of hostages and messaging that declare an Islamic state. More importantly,
the level of brutality in their attacks has intensified.
In Indonesia, members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a splinter group of JI that is
linked with ISIS, conducted a family-orchestrated suicide bombing attacks targeting Christian
churchgoers and police personnel on May 13 and 14, 2018.296 The attacks on the 13th of May
occurred in three Christian churches at Surabaya, Indonesia which resulted in 12 fatalities and
several others wounded. The 14th of May attack happened at a police headquarters of the same
island injuring seven people.297 Security observers claim that it was the first family-orchestrated
suicide attacks bombing attacks occurred in Indonesia that involved minors and women.
Indonesian authorities cracked down on JAD network and arrested several individuals linked to
the said group and JI.
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In the Philippines, joint ASG and Maute group, a newly established Islamic violent
extremist group linked with ISIS, seized a city and declared it as ISIS caliphate in Southeast Asia
in 2017. Marawi City, a Muslim populated city in the southern Philippines, was recaptured by
the Philippine government security forces after five months of battle, which eventually resulted
in the neutralization of the Maute Group entirely. The incident yielded more than 1,000 dead
(terrorists, soldiers, and civilians) and almost 200,000 internally displaced people (IDP).298
According to Eduardo del Rosario, Chief of Task Force ―Bangon Marawi‖ or the agency in
charge for the rehabilitation of Marawi City, there were around $340 million U.S. dollars‘ worth
of property that was damaged. Meanwhile, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF) and
Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (Supporters of ISIS in the Philippines or AKP), both splinter
groups of MILF, pledged their allegiance with ISIS and conducted small scale atrocities in their
area of operations to demonstrate their relevance to the bigger organization.
In 2019, the U.S. led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS was successful in recovering ISIS
declared territory in the Middle East. Security officials and analysts believe that ISIS may have
been defeated in its declared caliphate but the jihadist group remains a threat to the international
community. Like other countries worldwide, Indonesia and the Philippine authorities are
concerned about the threat posed by returning ISIS members to their home countries and other
ISIS foreign fighters seeking harbor in the region. Based on the assessment of the U.S. Bureau of
Counterterrorism for Indonesia in 2017, ―Returning foreign terrorist fighters with new
operational training, skills, experience, networks, and access to funding could help launch more
sophisticated attacks against Indonesian government personnel or facilities, Western targets, and
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other soft targets and public spaces.‖299
In early 2019, Philippine security forces first recorded an incident of the ASG
masterminding a suicide bombing attack with the help of alleged Indonesian couples who killed
themselves inside a Catholic cathedral during the celebration of Sunday service in Jolo, Sulu.300
The attacks killed 20 individuals both civilian and military, injured 102 others, and damaged the
entire interior of the cathedral.301 A security analyst in the Philippines claimed that at least 100
ISIS-foreign members entered the country and joined local terrorist groups.302 In June 28, 2019,
Philippine experienced terror attacks from the first Filipino suicide bombers, who blew
themselves in the entrance of a military camp in the province of Sulu. The incident killed 5
individuals comprising three soldiers and two civilians.303 The Philippine security forces are
focused on cracking down on the members of ASG and other ISIS affiliates in the country as it is
among the top priorities of the present administration.
In summary, Islamic militancy has been a threat in Southeast Asian countries for
millennia. While the previous threat only affects a concerned country, the rise of transnational
Islamic violent extremist groups influenced the spread of Islamic violent extremism in the entire
299

Bureau of Counterterrorism. ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2017,‖ p. 55.
―Philippine Minister ‗certain‘ Church Bombers Were Indonesian.‖ Text. The Straits
Times, February 2, 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippine-minister-certainchurch-bombers-were-indonesian.
301
Gutierrez, Jason. ―Philippines Cathedral Bombing Kills 20 - The New York Times.‖
New York Times, January 29, 2019, sec. Asia Pacific.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/world/asia/philippines-jolo-cathedral-bombing.html.
302
GMA News. ―Around 100 ISIS-Inspired Foreign Bandits Now in PHL, Expert Says.‖
GMA News Online, March 12, 2019.
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/687741/around-100-isis-inspired-foreignbandits-now-in-phl-expert-says/story/.
303
Philstar. ―Military Confirms First Filipino ‗suicide Bomber‘ behind Sulu Attack |
Philstar.Com.‖ Philstar Global, July 10, 2019.
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/07/10/1933609/military-confirms-first-filipino-suicidebomber-behind-sulu-attack.
300

81

region. Southeast Asia becomes one of the important hubs of Al Qaeda and ISIS in pursuing its
strategic goals. Having the world‘s largest population of Sunni Muslims, the region has both
their potential sympathizers and potential targets. Al Qaeda and ISIS became the common nodes
that connect Southeast Asia‘s Islamic violent extremist groups and make them to collaborate in
conducting terrorist acts.
Furthermore, the training and other support that Al Qaeda provided had contributed to
intensity and lethality of terrorist attacks that take place in the region. While ISIS‘ expertise in
exploiting the Internet adds on the complexity of the terrorist threat because it incites more actors
to join their cause and it closes the gap of the line of communication between the Middle East
and Southeast Asia. On the one hand, Al Qaida and ISIS affiliate groups and inspired-individuals
in Southeast Asia will continue to adhere to their core groups‘ ideology, leadership, strategy, and
tactics. On the other hand, Al Qaeda and ISIS will continue to support their regional affiliates
and inspired-individuals with funds, logistics, and training on their updated means of conducting
terrorist attacks, which could potentially include the use of CW as the mass casualty trend – such
as suicide bombing –as terrorist attacks continue in Southeast Asia.

Assessment of Chemical Terrorism in Southeast Asia
To answer this question: will Southeast Asia become a domain for chemical terrorism
within five years? It is imperative to examine and answer the following sub-questions: Who will
be the potential actors of chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia? Do the potential actors have the
intent and capability to conduct chemical terrorism? And, what are the inhibiting factors that can
prevent the success of potential actors from acquiring, employing and if used, mitigating the
effects of CW? For this paper, a successful chemical terrorism attack means that an actor
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acquired the CW capability and employed such capability causing harm or damage in the limited
geographical scope examined - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, or the Philippines.
To assess the likelihood of an event, this paper uses the following rating: low, indicates
that there is a less probability that the event will happen; moderate, indicates that there is neither
low nor high possibility of the event to happen; high, indicates that there is a big probability that
the event will happen.
In chapter three, this paper established that Al Qaeda and ISIS have both the intent and
the capability to conduct chemical terrorism. As part of the assumptions, these terrorist core
groups are considered as the proliferator of CW technical know-how for the potential actors of
chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia. This paper established that Al Qaeda and ISIS provided
training such as bomb-making to their affiliate groups and inspired-individuals. Thus, it could be
viewed that the potential regional actors of chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia will be among
the following active Al Qaeda and ISIS‘ affiliate groups in the region: JI, ASG, BIFF, JAD, and
AKP, or lone wolf attackers.
While these actors already showed their eagerness to commit terrorism in the region,
there are underlying motivations for these groups or individuals to embrace chemical terrorism.
First, CW will be used to inflict civilian mass casualties and cause psychological reactions. The
case studies of chemical incidents in chapter two particularly during WWI, Iran-Iraq wars, Japan
attacks, and Syrian government‘s CW use, showed that employment of CW were effective in
inflicting casualties especially on poorly prepared or soft targets like civilians. The case studies
also showed the psychological effects of CW on the victims and policymakers in both short and
long-term.
Second, CW will be used as weapons of denial and as force multipliers. Southeast Asian
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governments are committed to crackdown Al Qaeda and ISIS‘ affiliates which caused severe
losses on the terrorists‘ side. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS demonstrated the effectiveness of CW to
slow down chasing coalition troops as well as force multipliers in fighting larger government
forces.
Third, CW will be used as weapons of retaliation in targeting U.S. interests in the region.
CW can be employed targeting fortified U.S. infrastructure and temporary military encampments
in the region, which re-echoed Scott Stewart‘s assessment on why terrorist desire CW capability.
Furthermore, Islamic violent extremists may employ CW to cause economic sabotage in the
region that could directly or indirectly affect the United States. In 2004 Shangri-La Dialogue,
Tony Tan, then Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, expressed his concern on the possibility that
members of the terrorist group will hijack ships and will turn them into ―floating bombs‖ then
will crash them into critical infrastructure such as oil refineries or ports in Singapore, which
―would cripple world trade‖ as a result.304 Although the potential cause of damage of CW against
a business establishment is indefinite, the disruption of commerce to decontaminate the area may
already cause a significant amount of income loss.
To assess how the potential actors could acquire the CW, this paper examines the
following six interconnected factors that, if all could be satisfied, would lead to successful CW
proliferation in the region: people, material, infrastructure, money, information, and lines of
communication (LOC). Similarly, WMD experts are also targeting these factors in countering
WMD proliferation.305
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People. People refer to the ―decision-makers, scientists, brokers, workers and
engineers.‖306 It is assessed as high that the identified potential actors‘ decision-makers will
support and facilitate CW production in the region considering the advantages discussed in
chapter two. Al Qaeda and ISIS already have experienced scientists that can guide the potential
actors either virtually or in person. As elaborated by Robert Turkington in chapter two,
synthesizing commercial chemicals to produce a chemical agent is achievable by anyone who
follows the step-by-step procedures. Islamic violent extremist groups could utilize the overt
assistance of their sympathizers such as relatives, women, and minors in developing the CW
unsuspected.
Materials. Materials are the components needed to produce CW such as parts, products,
commodities, raw materials, and tools.307 Among the industries in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Philippines that uses chemical are in the field of agriculture, oil and gas, and
mining. Dual-use chemical precursors shown in Table 1 can also be utilized to synthesize the
terrorists desired chemical agents. Besides, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene, the
chemical component use by Al Qaeda and ISIS in their CW program, are available in the
commercial market.
Electronic products such as disposable mobile phones, sim-cards, electrical circuit
boards, and other electrical components necessary to produce the CW designed are affordable in
the market. Islamic violent extremist groups are also utilizing the said electronic products for the
production of their IEDs. Additionally, potential actors can use indigenous materials or modern
technology such as drones for their CW delivery system.
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Table 1. List of Dual-Use Chemical Precursors
______________________________________________________________________________
Precursors
CW Agent
Commercial Product
______________________________________________________________________________
Thiodiglycol
Sulfur mustard
plastic, dyes, inks
Thionyl chloride

Sulfur mustard

pesticides

Sodium sulphide

Sulfur mustard

paper

Phosphorous oxychloride

Tabun

insecticides

Dimethylamine

Tabun

detergents

Sodium cyanide

Tabun

dyes, pigments, gold recovery

Dimethyl methyphosponate

G agents

fire retardants

Dimethyl hydrochloride

G agents

pharmaceuticals

Potassium biflouride

G agents

ceramics

Diethyl phosphite
G agents
paint solvents
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies Underlying Weapons of
Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 29.

Infrastructure. Infrastructure refers to ―physical and virtual infrastructure of a
network.‖308 In acquiring CW capability, potential actors in Southeast Asia do not need to adhere
with ideal chemical warfare capability as outlined by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology
Assessment in chapter two. CW development program does not need a sophisticated
infrastructure as compared to the nuclear weapons program. For example, a radicalized chemist
can surreptitiously synthesize chemical agents in his/her controlled laboratory. Orsolya Raczova,
a security analyst in Global Risk Insights, argued that ―terrorist groups such as Aum, Al-Qaeda
and ISIS with controlled territories (safe havens), enable them to work on CW programs without
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external interference.‖309 Similarly, JI, JAD, ASG, BIFF, and AKP could utilize their respective
safe havens to establish the CW program. In 2017, the U.S. Bureau of Counterterrorism claimed
that Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Littoral and the Southern Philippines are terrorist safe havens in
Southeast Asia. Lone wolf actors may also manufacture their CW in their own home or
controlled places unnoticed.
Money. Money refers to any form of financial resources.310 Al Qaeda with $300 million
U.S. dollars and ISIS with $200 million U.S. dollars ranked fourth and fifth, respectively, in
Forbes‘ 2017 top ten wealthiest terrorist groups worldwide.311 As established in this paper,
affiliate groups receive financial support from the core groups which they could use to finance
the CW program.
Aside from the financial support coming from the core groups, regional actors can
generate their own funds. Colin P. Clarke, Senior Fellow at The Soufan Center, detailed in his
book, Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare”, on how
terrorist groups make money. He categorizes the financial activities into two groups. First, the
―gray economy‖ includes licit and illicit activities performed by the terrorist such as diaspora
support, charities, fraud business, front companies, and money laundering. Second, the ―dark
economy‖ comprises kidnap for ransom, robbery, smuggling, trafficking, and extortion. The U.S.
Bureau of Counterterrorism assessed that ―Kidnapping-for-ransom remained an ongoing threat
and a source of funding for terrorist networks based in the southern Philippines.‖312 Furthermore,
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a CW program is will not cause too much financial burden for potential actors as they are
relatively inexpensive to develop.
Information. Information refers to ―data, knowledge, orders, commands, and facts.‖313Al
Qaeda and ISIS documented their respective CW program. The blueprint of Al Qaeda‘s
mubtakkar recovered by the CIA and MI6 in 2003 is one of the hard evidence of the
dissemination of CW know-how among terrorists. Production of CW can be immediate because
potential actors do not need to undergo research and development. Besides, some information in
developing CW is readily available in open source literature.
Lines of Communications (LOC). Lines of communications refer to ―either physical or
virtual means of moving the information, money, or material.‖314 Indonesia‘s, Malaysia‘s and the
Philippines‘ maritime borders are connected in Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, a vast body of water with a
total area of around 210,000 square miles (shown in Figure. 6). According to the U.S. Bureau of
Counterterrorism, smuggling and piracy groups operating in Sulu-Sulawesi Seas often support
the terrorist networks in the movement of personnel, equipment, and funds.315 Security analysts
believe that foreign fighters who joined the ASG and Maute Group in Marawi City siege in 2017
passed through this LOC. ASG is also using this LOC in its kidnap-for-ransom activities in
southern Philippines and Malaysia.316
As discussed in chapter one, Christopher Harmon and Randall Bowdish, claim that
terrorists maintain websites and social media accounts to disseminate information and as a means

313

Frumin, Amy, et.al. ―The State of the Art in Contemporary CWMD Thinking,‖ p. 70.
Ibid., p. 70.
315
Bureau of Counterterrorism. ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2017,‖ p. 227.
316
World Maritime News Staff. ―ReCAAP Warns of Abu Sayyaf Kidnapping Threat in
Malaysia.‖ World Maritime News, May 2, 2018.
https://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/251765/recaap-warns-of-abu-sayyaf-kidnap-threat-inmalaysia/.
314

88

of communication. ISIS has been utilizing the Internet as its main tool for messaging. Online
money transfer platforms are also exploited by the terrorists as evidenced by the FBI, which
uncovered ―a global financial network run by a senior Islamic State official that funneled money
to an alleged ISIS operative in the U.S. through fake eBay transactions.‖317
While countering chemical terrorism goes with the policies and strategies of countering
the threat of terrorism in general, mitigating the effects of CW demands a different level of
readiness. As discussed, the U.S. supported Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines through
ATA and NADR to enhance their capabilities in countering terrorism. In Indonesia, laws were
enacted as a legal basis for counterterrorism and regulations were imposed to control chemical
and hazardous substances. Among the significant laws and regulations are the Law on
Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism, the Law on Prevention of Terrorist Financing, the
Government Regulation Number 74 year 2001 regarding Hazardous and Toxic Material
Management, and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) Regulation 36/2017 on
Regulation and Notification Procedure for Hazardous and Toxic Substances. In 2002, Indonesia
government established the Detachment 88, an elite police counterterrorism force, to lead
counterterrorism operations and investigations and the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports
and Analysis Center (PPATK), which is responsible on financial intelligence.318 These units
successfully contained JI threat in the country and currently, they are pursuing JAD members.
Indonesia is a member of Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a regional intergovernment organization that aims to combat money laundering. Additionally, the Indonesian
government and civil society leader develop countering violent extremism (CVE) programs,
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which focus on targeting the radical ideology of the terrorists.319
In 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines launched the Trilateral Maritime Patrol
and Joint Air Patrol as part of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement, which aims to secure the
shared maritime environment among the three countries.320 Indonesian Army has trained,
equipped, and ready deployable chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense
units since 1986. It also formed a Police CBRN defense unit in 2009. In 2018, Indonesia held its
first CBRN National Meeting which aims to prevent and mitigate CBRN risks.
Malaysian authorities are utilizing the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960 as the main
legal basis for counterterrorism operations. Malaysian security forces can arrest individuals
suspected as terrorists as permitted in ISA. Malaysia is a member of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF), a worldwide inter-government organization aim to combat money laundering, and
of the APG. Malaysia also implements the Classification, Labelling and Safety Data Sheet of
Hazardous Chemicals (CLASS) Regulations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994
requiring chemical suppliers to properly label their hazardous chemical supply to ensure the
safety in the workplace.321 Malaysia also conducts CVE for its youth who are targeted for
radicalization by ISIS. Malaysian military and police maintain their respective CBRN unit that
can respond to any possible CBRN incident.
Being the most affected country of Islamic violent extremism, the Philippine government
uses four different approaches in dealing with the threat of terrorism: military, political,
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economic, and countering terrorist ideology.322 The Human Security Act 2007 is the main legal
basis of Philippine security forces in conducting counterterrorism operations. The Armed Forces
of the Philippine (AFP) is the main government instrument that cracks down on Islamic violent
extremist groups in the country. The Philippine government enhances the capability of its
security forces through upgrade and training. In terms of readiness on possible chemical attacks,
the AFP‘s CBRN capability is still nascent. The current CBRN platoon of the Philippine Army is
currently acquiring both the expertise and equipment.323 The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
Special Rescue and HAZMAT Unit, the lead agency for CBRN incident response in the
Philippines, shows more preparedness in terms of equipment and knowledge in mitigating the
effects of chemical incidents.
Another counterterrorism effort by the Philippine government is via peaceful settlement
with the threat groups. As discussed in the preceding section, the said country concluded a peace
settlement with MILF and MNLF separatist groups. Also, the Philippine government focuses on
opening more economic opportunity in Mindanao to alleviate poverty in the region, which is
among the issues or grievances exploited by the terrorists in their recruitment. The Philippines
adopted the CVE program to counter terrorist‘s ideology and is also a member of the AsiaPacific Group on Money Laundering. Chemical control and inventory regulations are also
present in this country.
Singapore, being the wealthiest country in the region, has all the means to maintain its
readiness in counterterrorism and respond to a possible chemical incident at a higher standard.
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Singapore‘s ISA is instrumental in foiling terrorist plots in the country and arresting suspected
individuals that are deemed a threat to national security. Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)
conducts regular and extensive counterterrorism drills in the country involving scenarios such as
hostage-taking and response to IED and CBRN related threats ―to test and validate Singapore‘s
multi-agency response plan in the event of a terror attack.‖324 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
and the Philippines collaborate with several multinational organizations such as the UN,
ASEAN, OPCW, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Global Counterterrorism
Forum (GTR) to promote cooperation in counterterrorism efforts and training.
Having examined the factors that would lead to chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia, the
possibility for potential actors to acquire CW and potentially use this capability is high making
Southeast Asia as a domain for chemical terrorism. The intent of potential actors in committing
chemical terrorism is real. Furthermore, CW could be used in targeting military, police, civilians,
and U.S. interests in the region, which would influence policymakers‘ decision that may favor
their cause.
The technical know-how and financial support that the potential actors could avail from
terrorist core groups close the gap between the actors‘ intent and their CW capability. Southeast
Asia provides an environment that can be viewed as an opportunity for the potential actors. SuluSulawesi Seas‘ vastness will still serve as a security challenge for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines. Collaboration between the terrorist groups and other transnational organized
criminals adds to the complexity of countering terrorism in the region. Southeast Asia‘s major
industries utilizing dual-use chemical precursors and the availability of toxic industrial chemical
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in the commercial market serve as another opportunity for the potential actors to have access on
the chemicals needed for the terrorist to develop CW program.
While some governments showed their readiness on preventing the use and mitigation of
the effects of CW, potential actors are keen on looking for the target‘s vulnerability turning into
an opportunity to conduct chemical terrorism. As a result, surprise attacks could create bigger
damage both physically and psychologically on victims and on Southeast Asian society writ
large. Potential actors will use CW not to replace its usual method of attack in inflicting mass
casualties – such as IEDs and suicide bombing attacks – but to augment with those existing
capabilities, which add burden on the affected government directly or indirectly. CBRN defense
readiness entails significant funding for equipment and training. Finally, possessing CW
capability adds to the terrorist groups‘ legitimacy that attracts more extremists or recruits to join
their ranks and fight to attain the regional goal and strategic goals of the Middle East‘ core
groups.

93

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Terrorism in Southeast Asia has evolved over time and there are no indications that it is
going to end soon. Despite the successes of counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia, Islamic
violent extremism continues to grow as an ideology– ―for holy warriors of any faith, the devoted
are always right and the infidels always wrong, whoever the protagonist and the circumstances
they encounter.‖325 Terrorism will continue to be used by these individuals as tactics against
established governments to achieve local or regional political objectives.
The nexus between Southeast Asian Islamic violent extremists and the core groups in the
Middle East have influenced the level of intensity and lethality of terrorist attacks in the region.
Al Qaeda and ISIS will continue to support their affiliates with funding, training, and publicity
given the demographic importance of the region to the Sunni community. The Internet disrupts
the natural barrier connecting them thereby providing ease in disseminating new methods of
attack to local terrorists.
The threat of chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia is a serious concern that needs to be
addressed before it reaches to unprecedented levels and causes major destruction. In The Gray
Rhino: How to Recognize an Act on the Obvious Danger, Michele Wucker writes about a
catastrophe with enormous consequences that is noticeable that even a sensible person can see it
coming, hence, referred to as the Gray Rhino. Chemical terrorism in Southeast Asia is
considered a Gray Rhino given that there is a high probability of this threat occurring in the next
five years, and if it occurred, it will be catastrophic to the targeted society considering the
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impacts of CW. The gap that exists between intent and acquiring a full CW capability have been
narrowed which shifts the question whether or not chemical terrorism will happen in Southeast
Asia into when it will happen.
Threat awareness and preparedness are among the key factors that lead to the prevention
and mitigation of surprise chemical attack scenarios. In addressing the threat of chemical
terrorism, both multilateral and national approaches are essential. Broadly, a multilateral
approach includes security cooperation, capacity building, and effective collaboration among
concerned governments and the international community. Information sharing on potential threat
actors, disrupting the financial networks of Islamic violent extremists, and expertise exchanges in
CBRN are a few examples of areas where cooperation and collaboration can be improved in
Southeast Asia. The UN through the OPCW, the U.S., and Singapore–all having a high-level of
technical expertise on CBRN defense– are among the potential sources of knowledge and best
practices in mitigation of CW effects.
A national approach against chemical terrorism is focused on security operations that
crack down on potential actors through the following measures: strengthening a whole of nation
approach in delegitimizing terrorist ideology; maintaining and amending of laws and regulations,
if necessary, especially pertaining to the control of CW raw materials; bolstering of CBRN
defense and response capability at the national level; involving the community in the
preparedness of possible chemical incidents, and; building resilience to potential targets for
terrorist recruitment and spread of violent extremist narratives.
There are several factors that may affect the security situation in Southeast Asia within
the next five years, which is part of the limitations of this research. However, the non-occurrence
of a chemical terrorism incident within the set timeframe of the study does not render the threat
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as invalid owing to the randomness of other factors that play into these phenomena. For instance,
there are numerous events that could influence terrorists in terms of determining the timing of
conducting attacks not to mention the counterterrorism efforts that the security apparatus of a
country put in to prevent them from happening. As established in this research, Al Qaeda goes to
great lengths in planning and preparation before executing an attack against strategic or symbolic
targets. Given the findings in this research, a continuous study of terrorism and the threat of
chemical terrorism, in particular, is recommended in order to observe real situation locally and
orient effective policies accordingly.
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Appendix A

Islamic Armed Groups in Indonesia by Area of Operations
Source: Ahnaf, Mohammad Iqbal. ―Weak State Helps Extremism in Indonesia.‖ Center for
Religious and Cross-cultural Studies, October 23, 2011. https://crcs.ugm.ac.id/articles/491/weakstate-helps-extremism-in-indonesia.html.
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Appendix B

Islamic Armed Groups in the Philippines by Area of Operation
Source: ―In the Philippines, the ‗Punisher‘ Takes on Terrorism.‖ Stratfor, September 10, 2016.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/philippines-punisher-takes-terrorism.
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